On the 29th day of the 12th month of the 11th year of Shaoxing (January 27, 1142), Yue Fei was executed in prison at the Court of Judicial Review, at the age of thirty-nine. The charge was "perhaps there is evidence" (mouxuyou).[1] Four hundred eighty-six years later, on the 16th day of the 8th month of the 3rd year of Chongzhen (September 22, 1630), Yuan Chonghuan was executed by lingchi (death by a thousand cuts) at Xishi in Beijing, where "the people of the capital scrambled to buy and eat his flesh."[2] The charge was "colluding with the enemy and treason." Both great generals died at the hands of the very courts they had sworn to serve. Traditional narratives attribute this to incompetent rulers and treacherous ministers — Zhao Gou listened to Qin Hui, Chongzhen fell for an enemy stratagem. But this explanation relies too heavily on the personal "incompetence" and "treachery" of individuals, overlooking deeper structural factors. When we analyze these two cases through the framework of game theory, we discover that the interaction between meritorious ministers and their sovereigns is, in essence, a repeated game under conditions of information asymmetry; and under certain conditions, the equilibrium outcome of this game is tragedy.

I. The Principal-Agent Problem: The Economic Essence of the Meritorious Minister's Dilemma

1.1 When the Emperor Becomes the Principal

From an economics perspective, the relationship between emperor and meritorious minister is fundamentally a principal-agent relationship.[3] The emperor (principal) needs the minister (agent) to perform certain tasks — fighting wars, governing, maintaining order — but the emperor cannot fully observe the minister's actions and intentions, giving rise to information asymmetry.

The core dilemma of the principal-agent problem is that the agent may exploit their informational advantage to pursue self-interest rather than the principal's interest. In a corporate context, this manifests as managers "shirking" or "tunneling"; in a political context, it manifests as ministers "building personal armies" or "plotting rebellion."

Jensen and Meckling, in their classic 1976 paper, identified three methods for resolving principal-agent problems:[4]

  • Monitoring: The principal invests resources to observe the agent's behavior.
  • Incentive Alignment: Designing compensation structures to align the agent's interests with the principal's.
  • Bonding: The agent proactively provides guarantees or accepts constraints to prove they will not betray the principal.

In imperial China, all three mechanisms suffered from severe deficiencies:

  • The Limits of Monitoring: Sequestered deep within the palace, the emperor was highly dependent on generals' reports for information about the front lines. Information transmission was delayed, distorted, and even deliberately manipulated. How much could Zhao Gou truly know about Yue Fei's battlefield performance?
  • The Incentive Dilemma: How does one reward a general whose "achievements are too great"? Make him a prince? Give him more troops? These very rewards would increase his capacity for rebellion.
  • The Incredibility of Bonding: How does a meritorious minister prove he "harbors no ulterior motives"? Oaths of loyalty are cheap talk — anyone can make them. Genuine bonding requires costly signals, but what signal is sufficiently credible?

1.2 Yue Fei's "Agent" Dilemma

Yue Fei confronted an extreme version of the principal-agent problem.

In the 10th year of Shaoxing (1140), Yue Fei led his northern expedition, winning battle after battle and recovering vast swathes of lost territory. Yet his very success became his greatest crisis. At this point, Yue Fei:

  • Commanded the Yue Family Army of over 100,000 men, the most powerful military force in the Southern Song dynasty.[5]
  • Enjoyed immense personal prestige within the military — the very name "Yue Family Army" revealed a tendency toward the privatization of military force.
  • Publicly advocated "welcoming back the two emperors" — if the former emperors Huizong and Qinzong were actually brought back, Zhao Gou's claim to the throne would be rendered awkward.[6]

From the principal's (Zhao Gou's) perspective, Yue Fei's "agent risk" was extremely high:

  • Capability Risk: Yue Fei had the capability to rebel — his military strength was sufficient to challenge the central government.
  • Unobservable Intent: Whether Yue Fei harbored rebellious intentions was something Zhao Gou could not directly observe, only speculate about.
  • Irreversibility of Action: Once Yue Fei decided to rebel, the consequences would be irreversible.

Under these circumstances, the logic of "perhaps there is evidence" becomes comprehensible — not "perhaps he is guilty," but "perhaps there is a risk." From the perspective of risk management, when someone's potential threat is sufficiently great and you cannot ascertain their true intentions, "preemptive elimination" becomes a rational option.[7]

This is not a defense of Zhao Gou — his decision may have been wrong, immoral, even foolish. But it was not entirely "irrational"; it had its own structural logic.

1.3 Yuan Chonghuan's "Moral Hazard"

Yuan Chonghuan's case presents another facet of the principal-agent problem: moral hazard.

In the 6th year of Tianqi (1626), Yuan Chonghuan repelled Nurhaci at Ningyuan, becoming famous overnight.[8] After the Chongzhen Emperor ascended the throne, Yuan was appointed Supreme Commander of Ji-Liao and granted full discretionary authority. He promised the emperor: "Give me five years, and I will recover all of Liaodong."[9]

However, Yuan Chonghuan's conduct after receiving full authority raised serious moral hazard concerns:

  • Unauthorized Execution of Mao Wenlong: In the 1st year of Chongzhen (1628), Yuan Chonghuan executed the Dongjiang General Mao Wenlong on "twelve major charges" without imperial authorization.[10] This act demonstrated his unchecked power — if he could execute a general on his own authority, might he not take similar action against the court?
  • Unauthorized Peace Negotiations: Yuan Chonghuan had privately contacted the Later Jin regime to explore peace.[11] Such "act first, report later" diplomacy raised doubts about his loyalty.
  • The Suspicious Circumstances of the Jisi Incident: In the 2nd year of Chongzhen (1629), Huang Taiji bypassed Yuan Chonghuan's defensive line and marched directly on Beijing. Yuan led his troops to reinforce the capital, but why had he failed to provide advance warning? Why had he allowed enemy forces to pass through his defense zone?[12]

From the principal's (Chongzhen's) perspective, Yuan Chonghuan's pattern of behavior was highly suspicious: he had been granted enormous power, yet wielded it in ways that were difficult to comprehend. Even without the Later Jin's "counter-intelligence stratagem," Chongzhen's trust in Yuan had already been shaken.[13]

II. The Signaling Game: How Can Loyalty Be Proven?

2.1 Spence's Signaling Model

Michael Spence, the 2001 Nobel laureate in Economics, proposed his signaling model in 1973 to explain market behavior under conditions of information asymmetry.[14]

Spence's core insight is that when information asymmetry exists, the party possessing private information can transmit credible signals through costly actions. For example, job seekers obtain academic credentials (a time-consuming and expensive process) to signal their ability to employers; firms invest heavily in advertising to signal product quality to consumers.

For a signal to be effective, it must satisfy a key condition: separating equilibrium — the cost of sending the same signal must differ across types. If loyal and disloyal ministers bear the same cost for sending a "loyalty signal," then the signal has no discriminating power.[15]

2.2 The Failure of "Loyalty Signals"

The tragedies of Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan can be understood as failures of signaling.

The loyalty signals Yue Fei attempted to send included:

  • Repeatedly offering to resign, indicating no desire to cling to power.
  • Strict military discipline — "Freeze to death rather than tear down houses, starve to death rather than plunder."[16]
  • The tattoo "Serve the Nation with Utmost Loyalty" on his back — a literal pledge of his body.[17]

However, none of these signals were sufficient to create a separating equilibrium:

  • Resignation offers are cheap: Any ambitious person can feign modesty while biding their time. History provides precedents — Cao Cao "declined" the chancellorship three times, Wang Mang "declined" the imperial throne three times.
  • Strict discipline can be strategic: A general planning rebellion would likewise maintain discipline to enhance combat effectiveness.
  • A tattoo cannot prove intent: Tattooing "Serve the Nation with Utmost Loyalty" was a one-time act that could not demonstrate continuing future loyalty.

Worse still, some of Yue Fei's behaviors sent contrary signals:

  • The name "Yue Family Army" implied the privatization of military forces.
  • Multiple acts of insubordination — in the 7th year of Shaoxing (1137), dissatisfied with peace negotiations, Yue Fei left his army without authorization and returned to Mount Lu to mourn his mother.[18]
  • The slogan "Welcome back the two emperors" — whatever Yue Fei's true intentions, this slogan objectively threatened the legitimacy of Zhao Gou's claim to the throne.

2.3 Yuan Chonghuan's Mixed Signals

Yuan Chonghuan's signaling was even more chaotic.

On one hand, he sent strong "capability signals":

  • The great victory at Ningyuan proved he was the Ming dynasty's most capable general.
  • The promise to "recover Liaodong in five years" demonstrated his ambition and confidence.

On the other hand, his actions sent contradictory "intent signals":

  • The unauthorized execution of Mao Wenlong revealed a tendency to act beyond his authority.
  • Secret peace negotiations suggested he might have his own agenda.
  • His suspicious performance during the Jisi Incident — was it incompetence, or deliberate collusion with the enemy?

From the perspective of signaling theory, Yuan Chonghuan was trapped in a paradox: the stronger his "capability signals," the more critical his "intent signals" became; yet his behavior rendered his "intent signals" ambiguous or even negative.[19]

III. The Credible Commitment Problem: Why Oaths Are Not Enough

3.1 Schelling's Commitment Theory

Thomas Schelling, the 2005 Nobel laureate in Economics, analyzed the problem of commitment in depth in his classic work The Strategy of Conflict.[20]

Schelling argued that in strategic interactions, a commitment must be "credible" to be effective. A credible commitment must make the cost of violating the commitment higher than the cost of honoring it. Verbal oaths and emotional declarations are insufficient to constitute credible commitments — because the cost of ex post violation is too low.

Typical mechanisms for credible commitment include:

  • Hostages: Placing something of value under the other party's control. For example, in ancient times, feudal lords sent their sons as hostages to the sovereign's court.
  • Burning Bridges: Eliminating one's own fallback options, making defection impossible or prohibitively costly.
  • Reputation Mechanisms: In repeated games, defection damages reputation and affects future cooperation opportunities.
  • Third-Party Enforcement: Introducing a third party with the capacity to punish defectors.

3.2 The Minister's Commitment Dilemma

The core problem facing Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan was that they could not establish a credible commitment "not to rebel."

Let us examine each possible commitment mechanism:

The Hostage Mechanism

Yue Fei's family members were indeed under the court's control. However, the effectiveness of the hostage mechanism depends on how much the minister values his family — a sufficiently ruthless aspirant might willingly sacrifice his family for the throne. Zhao Gou could not determine which type of person Yue Fei was.

Burning Bridges

How could a meritorious minister "burn" his capacity for rebellion? The only method was to relinquish military power — but that was precisely the minister's most valuable asset. Zeng Guofan chose this path (disbanding the Xiang Army),[21] but Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan were both dealt with while wars were still ongoing — they had no opportunity to "downsize their forces."

Reputation Mechanisms

Reputation mechanisms require the expectation of repeated play — "if I defect this time, no one will trust me in the future." But for a minister contemplating rebellion, rebellion is a one-shot game — if successful, he becomes emperor and needs no one's "trust"; if he fails, he dies, and reputation is meaningless. Therefore, reputation mechanisms are ineffective against rebellion.

Third-Party Enforcement

In imperial China, no third party had the capacity to "enforce" a minister's loyalty commitment. The emperor himself was the supreme power; there was no higher authority to appeal to.

The conclusion is this: under the imperial system, meritorious ministers could not establish credible commitments "not to rebel." This was not a personal failure of Yue Fei or Yuan Chonghuan, but an inevitable consequence of the institutional structure.[22]

IV. The Prisoner's Dilemma: The Tragic Game Between Ministers and Sovereigns

4.1 Interaction Under Incomplete Information

Let us model the interaction between meritorious minister and sovereign as a game.

Assume the minister can be one of two types: "loyal" or "potentially disloyal." This is the minister's private information, unobservable to the sovereign. The sovereign also has two strategies: "trust" or "eliminate."

The payoff structure of the game is as follows:

  • If the minister is loyal and the sovereign chooses to trust: both benefit (the minister continues to serve, the sovereign receives loyal service).
  • If the minister is loyal and the sovereign chooses to eliminate: the sovereign bears a moral cost and loss of capability; the minister is unjustly killed.
  • If the minister is potentially disloyal and the sovereign chooses to trust: the minister may rebel, exposing the sovereign to enormous risk.
  • If the minister is potentially disloyal and the sovereign chooses to eliminate: the sovereign avoids the risk; the minister is eliminated.

In this game, the sovereign faces a "statistical decision" problem.[23] He must balance the tradeoff between "wrongly killing a loyal minister" (Type I Error) and "sparing a disloyal one" (Type II Error).

4.2 Bayesian Equilibrium Analysis

Analyzing from the perspective of a Bayesian game:[24]

Let p be the prior probability that the minister is "potentially disloyal." The sovereign's decision depends on:

  • The magnitude of p (how suspicious is the sovereign of this minister?)
  • The relative costs of the two types of error (wrongly killing a loyal minister vs. being overthrown by a disloyal one)

Under the imperial system, the cost of "being overthrown" is effectively infinite — losing the throne typically meant the loss of one's life and the extermination of one's entire clan. Therefore, even if p is very small (the probability of rebellion is low), as long as p > 0, the sovereign has an incentive to choose "eliminate."

This explains why "achievements that overshadow the sovereign" are so dangerous: not because the minister actually intends to rebel, but because the minister's capability raises the perceived value of p. An ordinary general, even if harboring rebellious intentions, would have no chance of success; but a legendary general like Yue Fei, once in rebellion, would have a far higher probability of success than most.

4.3 Deterioration in the Multi-Period Game

Worse still, this game deteriorates over time.

Assume the game is repeated each period. Each period, the minister can choose either "continue to serve loyally" or "rebel." If the minister is rational, he will choose to rebel at the "optimal moment" — when his military strength is at its peak and the court is at its weakest.

This means that a minister's military success coincides precisely with the most dangerous moment for potential rebellion. When Yue Fei won consecutive victories in his northern expedition in the 10th year of Shaoxing and recovered lost territory, this was the apex of his military power — and the moment Zhao Gou feared most.[25]

Yuan Chonghuan's situation was similar. During the Jisi Incident, he led his army to reinforce Beijing, with his troops encamped outside the city walls. If he harbored rebellious intentions, this was the perfect opportunity. Chongzhen could not be certain whether Yuan would "switch sides" at the critical juncture — and that uncertainty itself was lethal.

V. The Mechanism Design Perspective: How Institutions Produce Tragedy

5.1 An Incentive-Incompatible System

The 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson for their contributions to mechanism design theory.[26]

The central question of mechanism design theory is: how can we design a set of rules (a mechanism) such that participants, while pursuing their own interests, also achieve socially optimal outcomes? A good mechanism must be "incentive compatible" — it must give participants the motivation to tell the truth and do the right thing.

From the perspective of mechanism design, imperial China's system for managing meritorious ministers was "incentive incompatible":

  • The minister's incentive was to achieve merit and receive rewards, but the greater the merit, the greater the danger.
  • The sovereign's incentive was to preserve the throne, but the more capable the minister, the greater the threat.
  • The interests of both parties were aligned in the short term (defeating external enemies) but potentially conflicted in the long term (who holds power).

5.2 Historical Mechanism Innovations

Throughout history, different dynasties attempted various mechanisms to resolve this problem:

The Feudal Enfeoffment System of the Early Han

Liu Bang, upon founding his dynasty, enfeoffed meritorious ministers as kings, attempting to trade "power sharing" for loyalty. But this mechanism quickly failed — the very existence of non-imperial-surname kings was itself a threat, and ultimately Liu Bang and Empress Lu eliminated the non-imperial kings one by one.[27]

The Song Dynasty's "Releasing Military Power over a Cup of Wine"

Zhao Kuangyin resolved the problem through negotiation — trading wealth and honors for his generals' surrender of military authority.[28] This was a relatively successful mechanism, but its prerequisite was mutual trust in the other party's adherence to the agreement. Once trust collapsed, the mechanism would fail.

The Ming Dynasty's Jinyiwei Surveillance

Zhu Yuanzhang established a vast secret police apparatus to monitor meritorious ministers.[29] The problem with this mechanism was that surveillance itself provoked unease among ministers, paradoxically increasing the motivation to rebel; moreover, the surveillance apparatus itself could become corrupt or be co-opted.

5.3 An Unsolvable Dilemma?

From the perspective of mechanism design, the meritorious minister problem under the imperial system may be "unsolvable."[30]

The reasons are:

  • The Indivisibility of Power: The throne is "winner-take-all" and cannot be divided like corporate equity.
  • Absence of Third-Party Enforcement: There was no judicial system independent of imperial authority to guarantee contracts.
  • Asymmetry of Violence: Meritorious ministers typically held military power, while the emperor's advantage lay in legitimacy. Once legitimacy was questioned, the balance of power could reverse.

Under this structure, "achievements that overshadow the sovereign" was almost inevitable — not because ministers actually intended to overshadow anyone, but because the structure made it impossible for sovereigns not to be suspicious. The tragedies of Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan are concrete manifestations of this structural flaw.

VI. Beyond the "Incompetent Ruler and Slanderous Minister" Narrative

6.1 The Limitations of the Traditional Narrative

Traditional historiography attributes Yue Fei's death to "Qin Hui's slander" and "Zhao Gou's incompetence," and Yuan Chonghuan's death to "the Later Jin's counter-intelligence stratagem" and "Chongzhen's paranoia." This narrative has its value — it vindicates loyal ministers and condemns treacherous ones — but it also has serious limitations.

First, it overemphasizes individual factors and neglects structural ones. If someone other than Zhao Gou had been emperor, would Yue Fei have met a peaceful end? If Chongzhen had not fallen for the counter-intelligence stratagem, would Yuan Chonghuan have been spared? Based on our game-theoretic analysis, the answer is very likely no.

Second, it implicitly relies on counterfactual reasoning — "if only things had been different..." But history does not permit experiments; we cannot truly know what would have happened in a parallel universe without Qin Hui or without the counter-intelligence stratagem.

6.2 Insights from Structural Tragedy

From the perspectives of game theory and economics, the tragedies of Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan are "structural tragedies" — rooted in the inherent contradictions of the imperial system, not merely in individual moral failures.

This understanding yields several important insights:

  • Institutions matter more than individuals: Under an incentive-incompatible system, tragedy can occur even when all participants are "good people."
  • Trust requires institutional support: Relying solely on morality, oaths, or emotions cannot build stable trust relationships. Credible commitment requires institutional safeguards.
  • "Overmighty subjects" is a structural problem: It cannot be simply attributed to a sovereign's "incompetence" or a minister's "arrogance." As long as the power structure remains unchanged, this problem will recur.

6.3 The Exception of Zeng Guofan

In this context, Zeng Guofan's "retiring at the height of achievement" becomes all the more remarkable.[31]

Zeng Guofan faced a game structure similar to that of Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan — he too was a military leader whose achievements threatened the sovereign. But he made different choices: proactively disbanding the Xiang Army, nurturing successors, and pivoting toward education and culture. The essence of these actions was, amid an unfavorable game structure, to actively "change the game" — using costly signals (relinquishing military power) to prove he harbored no ulterior motives.

Zeng Guofan's success was not because he encountered an "enlightened ruler" (Empress Dowager Cixi and Prince Gong were equally suspicious), but because he understood the structure of the game and found a viable "equilibrium path." Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan perhaps lacked this game-theoretic intuition — or perhaps the historical circumstances they faced simply did not permit them to take this path.

Conclusion: Historical Lessons and Modern Echoes

The tragedies of Yue Fei and Yuan Chonghuan remain painful scars in the collective memory of the Chinese people. The phrase "perhaps there is evidence," read a millennium later, still sends chills down the spine; the scene of Yuan Chonghuan's lingchi execution, with "the people of the capital scrambling to eat his flesh," remains one of history's darkest moments.

Yet reexamining these tragedies through the lens of game theory, we gain not merely moral condemnation of "incompetent rulers" and "slanderous ministers," but a profound reflection on power structures. Under an incentive-incompatible system, the fate of loyal ministers may be predetermined; the curse of "achievements that overshadow the sovereign" is not a personal moral failure, but a structural inevitability.

This lesson remains relevant to modern society. In any organization — corporation, government, or nonprofit — when the power structure fails to provide credible commitment mechanisms, when information asymmetry cannot be effectively overcome, and when incentive mechanisms are incompatible, similar tragedies can occur. The relationships between executives and boards, founders and investors, generals and governments — all harbor similar game structures.

Before his death, Yue Fei reportedly cried out to the heavens: "The sun and heavens are clear! The sun and heavens are clear!"[32] He believed history would vindicate him. And indeed, history eventually cleared his name, posthumously granting him the honorific "Wu Mu" (Martial and Solemn). But game theory tells us that relying solely on "the clarity of heaven" is not enough — to prevent tragedy from recurring, what we need is institutional reform, not merely the aspiration toward moral transcendence.

References

  1. Deng Guangming, Biography of Yue Fei, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1983, pp. 389-410.
  2. Yan Chongnian, Biography of Yuan Chonghuan, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2005, pp. 312-315. See also History of the Ming Dynasty: Biography of Yuan Chonghuan.
  3. Ross, S. A. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139. JSTOR
  4. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
  5. Wang Zengyu, A New Biography of Yue Fei, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007, pp. 189-205.
  6. Deng Guangming, op. cit., pp. 298-312. On the political implications of the "Welcome back the two emperors" slogan, see Yao Congwu, "The Suspicion Between Emperor Gaozong of Song and Yue Fei," Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1962.
  7. The logic of "preemptive elimination" is analogous to the "preventive war" theory in international relations. See Levy, J. S. (1987). Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War. World Politics, 40(1), 82-107. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010195
  8. Yan Chongnian, op. cit., pp. 78-95.
  9. History of the Ming Dynasty: Biography of Yuan Chonghuan: "Chonghuan entered the audience and the Emperor asked about strategy. He replied: 'My strategy is already detailed in the memorial. Having received Your Majesty's special favor, I ask for discretionary authority; within five years, all of Liaodong can be recovered.'"
  10. On the controversy surrounding the unauthorized execution of Mao Wenlong, see Li Guangtao, "A Reassessment of Yuan Chonghuan's Execution of Mao Wenlong," Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1957; Yan Chongnian, op. cit., pp. 156-178.
  11. Yan Chongnian, op. cit., pp. 198-215.
  12. For a detailed account of the Jisi Incident, see Fan Shuzhi, History of the Late Ming, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2003, Chapter 8.
  13. On the evolution of Chongzhen's trust in Yuan Chonghuan, see Meng Sen, Lectures on Ming and Qing History, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2006, pp. 189-201.
  14. Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
  15. For technical details on separating equilibrium, see Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Chapter 13.
  16. Yue Fei's famous motto on military discipline, from History of the Song Dynasty: Biography of Yue Fei: "Freeze to death rather than tear down houses, starve to death rather than plunder."
  17. On the authenticity of the "Serve the Nation with Utmost Loyalty" tattoo, scholarly opinion varies. Deng Guangming considers the account credible, though other scholars have raised doubts. See Deng Guangming, op. cit., pp. 45-48.
  18. Wang Zengyu, op. cit., pp. 215-230.
  19. This tension between "capability signals" and "intent signals" is also common in modern corporate contexts. See Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983). Bargaining under Incomplete Information. Operations Research, 31(5), 835-851.
  20. Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 2.
  21. Luo Ergang, Military History of the Xiang Army, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1984, pp. 312-334. See also the earlier article in this series, "The Wisdom of Zeng Guofan's Strategic Retirement."
  22. This argument resonates with the institutional economics analysis in North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678
  23. For classic literature on statistical decision theory, see Wald, A. (1950). Statistical Decision Functions. New York: Wiley.
  24. Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159
  25. Deng Guangming, op. cit., pp. 320-345.
  26. Nobel Prize Committee. (2007). Mechanism Design Theory: Scientific Background. Nobel Prize
  27. Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of Emperor Gaozu; Biography of the Marquis of Huaiyin. ctext.org
  28. History of the Song Dynasty: Annals of Emperor Taizu; see also Wang Yuji, "A New Perspective on 'Releasing Military Power over a Cup of Wine,'" Historical Research, 1998, No. 3.
  29. Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1982, Chapter 1.
  30. This "unsolvable" conclusion bears a structural resemblance to Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley and his "impossibility theorem."
  31. Zhu Dong'an, Biography of Zeng Guofan, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2008, pp. 412-445.
  32. History of the Song Dynasty: Biography of Yue Fei: "Fei looked to the heavens and sighed: 'The sun and heavens are clear! The sun and heavens are clear!'"

← Back to Insights