In over two thousand years of Chinese imperial history, there were nine founding emperors of unified dynasties: Qin Shi Huang, Liu Bang, Liu Xiu, Sima Yan, Yang Jian, Li Yuan, Zhao Kuangyin, Kublai Khan, and Zhu Yuanzhang. Among them, only two were truly of "commoner" origin: Liu Bang (a low-ranking village headman) and Zhu Yuanzhang (a tenant farmer, beggar, and monk).[1] These two emperors shared a common trait: both launched large-scale purges of their meritorious officials. Liu Bang executed Han Xin, Peng Yue, Ying Bu, and other non-Liu kings; Zhu Yuanzhang went even further, virtually annihilating all founding officials, with the Hu Weiyong case implicating 30,000 people and the Lan Yu case implicating 15,000.[2] By contrast, the other seven founding emperors, all from aristocratic or official families, saw a much higher proportion of their meritorious officials die of natural causes. Was this mere coincidence?

I. Background Analysis of Founding Emperors Across Dynasties

Defining "Commoner" and "Aristocrat"

Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to define the concepts of "commoner" and "aristocrat." This article adopts the following criteria:

  • Commoner: Someone who, prior to uprising, lacked a prestigious family background, political resources, or social networks, and had to build a following from scratch.
  • Aristocrat/Official: Someone whose family already possessed a certain degree of political status, social prestige, or economic resources under the previous dynasty, and who could mobilize existing networks when launching an uprising.

Background Comparison of Nine Founding Emperors

Dynasty Founding Emperor Background Fate of Meritorious Officials
Qin Ying Zheng Royalty Most officials died naturally (Li Si was executed in his later years, but this was not a founding-official issue)
Western Han Liu Bang Commoner Large-scale execution of non-Liu kings
Eastern Han Liu Xiu Distant imperial clansman, local magnate Most of the "Twenty-Eight Generals of Yuntai" died naturally
Western Jin Sima Yan Scholar-gentry (Sima clan of Henei) Most officials died naturally
Sui Yang Jian Guanlong aristocracy (Yang clan of Hongnong) Most officials died naturally
Tang Li Yuan Guanlong aristocracy (Li clan of Longxi) Most of the "Twenty-Four Meritorious Officials of Lingyan Pavilion" died naturally[3]
Song Zhao Kuangyin Military family "Releasing military power over a cup of wine" — officials retired wealthy and in peace
Yuan Kublai Khan Mongol aristocracy (Golden Family) Most officials died naturally
Ming Zhu Yuanzhang Commoner Large-scale massacre of meritorious officials

This table clearly reveals a pattern: commoner-born founding emperors had extremely tense relationships with their meritorious officials, while aristocratic-born founding emperors maintained relatively harmonious ones. This was no accidental coincidence but rather had deep structural causes.

II. The Structural Dilemma of Commoner Emperors

2.1 The Scarcity of Social Capital

Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu proposed the concept of "social capital": the resources and influence an individual obtains through social networks.[4] Aristocratic founding rulers possessed abundant social capital before their uprisings: family prestige, kinship networks, retainers and former subordinates, and economic resources. This capital enabled them to:

  • Rapidly mobilize followers without becoming overly dependent on any single individual.
  • Maintain a certain distance from meritorious officials, since both sides shared common social backgrounds and behavioral norms.
  • Establish checks and balances among officials, since they understood the rules of the game within this circle.

By contrast, when Liu Bang launched his uprising, he was merely a village headman (equivalent to a village chief), and Zhu Yuanzhang was a destitute itinerant monk with nothing to his name. Their followers were mostly "sworn brothers" of equally humble origins.[5] The problems with this type of relationship were:

  • Excessive dependence: The commoner emperor's power base relied entirely on these "original shareholders," with no other social networks to draw upon.
  • Absence of norms: Without the tacit understandings of aristocratic society regarding "the proper boundaries between ruler and minister," officials did not know where their limits lay.
  • Breeding suspicion: The emperor's relationship with his officials was too intimate, which paradoxically made the emperor feel insecure — "he knows who I used to be."

2.2 The Fragility of Legitimacy

Aristocratic founding rulers typically drew their ruling legitimacy from multiple sources: bloodline, family prestige, official positions under the previous dynasty, and recognition by the scholar-gentry class. Liu Xiu was a descendant of the Han imperial house; Sima Yan, Yang Jian, and Li Yuan were all high-ranking nobles of the preceding dynasty; Zhao Kuangyin was the commander of the Later Zhou Imperial Guard.[6]

But the legitimacy of Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang derived almost entirely from the merit of "conquering the realm" — a merit they shared with their officials. This created a dilemma:

  • If "merit" was emphasized, then the officials were equally entitled to share in that legitimacy.
  • If "merit" was denied, then the emperor's own claim to the throne lost its foundation.

The solution adopted by both Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang was to monopolize legitimacy — constructing myths (Liu Bang's "Slaying the White Serpent," Zhu Yuanzhang's "True Dragon Son of Heaven") to distinguish themselves from their officials, then gradually weakening and eliminating anyone who might challenge this narrative.[7]

2.3 The Absence of Institutional Trust

Economist Douglass North argued that stable institutions are key to reducing "transaction costs."[8] In aristocratic societies, there existed a mature set of institutions and norms for managing the distribution of power between ruler and ministers: the feudal system, hierarchical rankings, and clan-based politics. These institutions were imperfect, but they provided a predictable framework.

For commoner-born founding rulers, however, this institutional framework was entirely unfamiliar. Their relationships with meritorious officials were built on "revolutionary camaraderie" forged in wartime, with no institutional safeguards.[9] Neither side knew:

  • How much reward should the officials receive?
  • Where did the boundaries of their power lie?
  • How should conflicts be resolved?

In the absence of institutional trust, "physical elimination" often became the ultimate means of dealing with uncertainty.

III. The Case of Liu Bang: "Those Who Are Not of the Liu Clan and Dare to Be Kings Shall Be Attacked by All"

The Dilemma of Non-Liu Kings

When Liu Bang established the Han Dynasty, he enfeoffed seven non-Liu kings: Han Xin (King of Chu), Peng Yue (King of Liang), Ying Bu (King of Huainan), Han Wang Xin, Zang Tu (King of Yan), Lu Wan (King of Yan), and Wu Rui (King of Changsha).[10] These enfeoffments were partly rewards for merit and partly compromises dictated by political reality — each had his own army and territory, and refusing them was not an option.

But from the moment of enfeoffment, both sides were trapped in a "prisoner's dilemma":

  • From the emperor's perspective: The non-Liu kings possessed armies and territories, making them potential threats. Even if they harbored no rebellious intent now, who could guarantee the future?
  • From the kings' perspective: The emperor would inevitably move to strip their domains sooner or later. Rather than waiting passively, should they strike first?

This mutual suspicion ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophecy: Han Xin was falsely accused of treason and executed by Empress Lu; Peng Yue was falsely accused of treason and his entire clan exterminated; Ying Bu actually did rebel and was killed after his defeat.[11] Of the seven non-Liu kings, only the family of Wu Rui, King of Changsha, survived — because his domain was the smallest and most remote, posing the least threat.

The "White Horse Oath": Institutionalized Exclusion

On his deathbed, Liu Bang swore the "White Horse Oath" with his officials: "Any who is not of the Liu clan and dares to be king shall be attacked by all under heaven."[12] The essence of this oath was to permanently exclude non-Liu officials from the highest echelon of power — you may be a marquis or a chancellor, but never a king.

From the perspective of institutional economics, this was a form of "property rights delineation": clearly demarcating the boundaries of interest between the imperial house and the officials, reducing future conflicts. But this "delineation" was unequal — the officials were permanently diminished, and their descendants could only compete within a limited arena.[13]

IV. The Case of Zhu Yuanzhang: The Most Extreme "Founder's Purge"

From Meritorious Officials to Condemned Criminals

Zhu Yuanzhang's massacre of meritorious officials was unprecedented in Chinese history. The major "cases" included:

  • The Hu Weiyong Case (1380): Chancellor Hu Weiyong was accused of treason, with over 30,000 implicated and executed, including the founding official Li Shanchang (prosecuted posthumously).[14]
  • The Lan Yu Case (1393): General Lan Yu was accused of treason, with 15,000 implicated and killed, virtually sweeping up all remaining founding officials.[15]
  • The Blank Seal Case and the Guo Huan Case: Purges targeting the bureaucratic system, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths.

Of the six dukes and twenty-eight marquises enfeoffed at the founding of the Ming Dynasty, virtually none survived to the end of the Hongwu reign. Among all founding officials, only Tang He managed to die a natural death — because he voluntarily surrendered his military authority and retired to his hometown, feigning illness.[16]

Zhu Yuanzhang's Deep-Seated Insecurity

Zhu Yuanzhang's killings far exceeded those of Liu Bang. This was closely tied to his background and experiences:

  • The lowest possible origins: Liu Bang was at least a village headman; Zhu Yuanzhang was a beggar and a monk, with a social status approaching zero. This background made him extremely sensitive to being looked down upon.[17]
  • Early trauma: Zhu Yuanzhang's parents and elder brother all starved to death during famine, and he himself wandered as a beggar for years. These traumatic experiences shaped a fundamental distrust of the world.
  • The threat of the "Huaixi Clique": Most of Zhu Yuanzhang's core officials came from the Huaixi region (present-day Anhui), forming a tightly knit interest group. This "factionalism" made Zhu Yuanzhang feel that his power could be undermined by his "brothers" at any moment.[18]

Historian Wu Han once analyzed: "In Zhu Yuanzhang's character, there was an extreme 'settling of accounts' mentality — he always felt that others owed him, and he had to balance the ledger."[19] This psychology drove him to launch purge after purge.

A "Political Legacy" to Pave the Way for the Crown Prince

Zhu Yuanzhang's late-reign killings also served another purpose: clearing potential threats for his heir (the future Jianwen Emperor). He reportedly told his crown prince: "Those I have executed are all the unjust of the realm. I do this for the sake of our descendants, to prevent future calamities."[20]

The logic was this: the officials followed me to conquer the realm, and they obey only me. When I am gone, will they submit to you — a prince who has never seen battle? Rather than leaving you to face these battle-hardened generals, it is better for me to eliminate them all now.

Ironically, the result of Zhu Yuanzhang's wholesale slaughter of officials was that when the Jianwen Emperor ascended the throne, he had virtually no capable commanders at his side. When the Prince of Yan, Zhu Di, launched the "Jingnan Campaign," the court could not field a single competent general to meet him.[21]

V. Stability Mechanisms of Aristocratic Regimes

5.1 Shared Rules of the Game

Aristocratic founding rulers and their meritorious officials typically came from the same social stratum and shared a set of tacit understandings about the distribution of power. Taking the Tang Dynasty as an example, Li Yuan and most of the "Twenty-Four Meritorious Officials of Lingyan Pavilion" belonged to the "Guanlong aristocratic bloc" — a group that had ruled northern China for nearly two centuries, from the Northern Wei through the Western Wei, Northern Zhou, and into the Sui-Tang period.[22]

This meant:

  • They were linked by generations of intermarriage (Li Yuan's empress was a daughter of Dugu Xin, and another of Dugu Xin's daughters married Yang Jian).
  • They shared a concept of "clan hierarchy" and understood what kind of rewards were "reasonable."
  • They had a common interest — maintaining the order of aristocratic rule, rather than allowing any single individual to monopolize all power.

5.2 "Releasing Military Power Over a Cup of Wine": An Institutionalized Exit Mechanism

Zhao Kuangyin's "releasing military power over a cup of wine" was the most elegant method of handling meritorious officials in history. In 961, he hosted a banquet for generals including Shi Shouxin and candidly told them: "I wish to bring peace to the armies of the realm, to establish the foundations of the state, and to share ease and comfort with all of you."[23] The message was clear: surrender your military power, and I will grant you wealth and honor — everyone stays safe.

This arrangement succeeded because of several preconditions:

  • Zhao Kuangyin's prestige: He was himself a former Imperial Guard commander, and the generals knew he had the capacity for a hard-line approach. A soft landing was the better option.
  • Shared background: Zhao Kuangyin and these generals were colleagues and brothers-in-arms, unlike Liu Bang's relationship of "village headman and vagrants." There was a basic foundation of trust.
  • Clear alternatives: What they would receive after surrendering military power (estates, mansions, noble titles) was clearly defined and enforceable.

In contrast, Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang could not employ this approach because the trust foundation between them and their officials was missing — neither side believed the other would honor an agreement.[24]

5.3 Liu Xiu's Approach: "Retire the Generals, Promote the Civil Officials"

Eastern Han founding emperor Liu Xiu adopted another institutionalized solution. He allowed his meritorious officials to enjoy exalted honors and generous compensation, but gradually transferred actual power to the civil bureaucracy. Most of the "Twenty-Eight Generals of Yuntai" lived out their lives in peace, though their descendants did not inherit political power.[25]

This model succeeded partly because of Liu Xiu's background: as a member of the Han imperial clan, he already possessed the symbolic capital of "orthodox legitimacy" and did not need to suppress his officials to consolidate his claim to power.

VI. Structural Lessons: From Imperial Rule to Modern Organizations

6.1 The "Founder's Dilemma" for Grassroots Entrepreneurs

The stories of Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang offer profound lessons for modern entrepreneurs. "Grassroots entrepreneurship" — where founders lack prestigious backgrounds and start from scratch — often faces similar structural dilemmas:[26]

  • The "revolutionary camaraderie" of early teams is difficult to institutionalize: The "brotherhood loyalty" of the startup phase often becomes a burden once the company scales up.
  • The founder's legitimacy is tied to meritorious officials: If the narrative of "building this together" is emphasized, officials have the right to demand a larger share; if that narrative is denied, the founder's own position is undermined.
  • Trust struggles to bridge class divides: Between grassroots founders and early teams, there is often excessive intimacy that paradoxically hinders the establishment of healthy professional distance.

6.2 Institutionalization Is the Only Way Out

Comparing commoner emperors with aristocratic emperors, the core insight is: the degree of institutionalization determines how smoothly power transitions occur.

The stability of aristocratic regimes was not because aristocrats were "more virtuous," but because they inherited a set of institutions and norms for managing power relationships. The commoner emperor's dilemma was that they had to "build institutions" while simultaneously "conquering the realm," and these two objectives follow contradictory logics: conquering requires personal charisma and "brotherhood loyalty," while institution-building requires rules and procedures that transcend individuals.[27]

The implications for modern organizations are:

  • Establish institutions early: Do not wait until the company is successful to start designing governance structures. By that point, vested interests have solidified and the cost of reform becomes prohibitively high.
  • Clear equity and exit mechanisms: How to quantify the contributions of early team members and how to compensate them upon departure should be spelled out from the very beginning.
  • Introduce "external norms": Grassroots founders especially need external advisors, board members, and investors to provide a behavioral framework that transcends "brotherhood loyalty."

6.3 Legitimacy Cannot Rest on Merit Alone

The legitimacy dilemma of Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang also reminds us that a leader's authority cannot be built solely on "past achievements."[28]

Achievements have an expiration date. When a company enters a new phase, past success may become irrelevant. If a founder's authority rests solely on "what I accomplished back then" and cannot be converted into an institutional role (such as clearly defined equity stakes, board seats, and decision-making authority), their position remains fundamentally unstable.

Conversely, if the contributions of meritorious officials are merely "remembered in the heart" without institutionalized rewards, they too will feel insecure and may resort to self-protective or aggressive actions.

Conclusion: Echoes of History

"When the cunning hare is killed, the hunting dog is cooked" is typically interpreted as a tale of imperial ruthlessness and the tragedy of loyal officials. But from a structural perspective, this is not a question of individual moral character, but rather an institutional dilemma arising from specific social conditions.

Commoner-born founding rulers faced a nearly impossible task: building a stable regime with virtually no social capital, no foundation of legitimacy, and no institutional framework. Their tragedies with meritorious officials were rooted in this structural dilemma, not in simple "ingratitude after using others."[29]

The relative stability of aristocratic regimes, in turn, was not because aristocrats were more "benevolent," but because they inherited a system of institutions and norms for managing power relationships. This system was imperfect, but it provided a predictable framework in which all parties knew the rules of the game.

For today's organizational leaders, the lesson from history is clear: do not wait until conflict erupts to remember the importance of institutions. Before the organization succeeds and interests multiply, clear rules, fair allocation mechanisms, and peaceful exit pathways should already be in place. Otherwise, the tragedy of "cooking the hunting dog" will repeat itself in different forms.[30]

History does not repeat itself, but the logic of human nature and institutions is strikingly consistent.