In 2019, when I took on the role of MBA Director and Master of Finance Director at the Zhejiang University International Business School (ZIBS), I set myself a challenge: to build a globally influential lecture platform with no budget, no established network, and no "big-name" endorsements. In the end, we successfully invited two Nobel laureates in Economics—Robert Aumann (2005) and Robert Wilson (2020)—along with dozens of business leaders from around the world, reaching a cumulative audience of over 300,000. This was not a miracle but rather the practical application of "multi-sided platform" logic. This article examines the resource mobilization process behind this feat through the lenses of platform economics, game theory, and entrepreneurship theory.

I. The Starting Point: Is a Lack of Resources an Obstacle or a Springboard for Creativity?

Conventional wisdom holds that inviting a Nobel laureate to speak requires three things: ample budget (to cover hefty speaking fees and travel expenses), powerful connections (to reach elite scholars), and institutional prestige (to make them willing to attend). This is a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma: while the university supported the initiative, under traditional assumptions, lacking influence made it difficult to justify significant upfront investment; and without resources, it was equally difficult to attract quality speakers. Although I had research experience at Cambridge, I had no direct links to Nobel laureates.

Yet this is precisely the starting point of what Saras Sarasvathy calls "effectuation" thinking: rather than asking "What resources do I need to achieve my goal?" the question becomes "What possibilities can I create with the resources I already have?"[1] Sarasvathy studied the decision-making patterns of 27 successful entrepreneurs and found that they did not set goals first and then seek the means—instead, they started with available resources and discovered opportunities and shaped goals along the way. This stands in stark contrast to traditional "causation" reasoning.[2]

What did we have? An emerging business school platform, a passion for knowledge dissemination, and a team willing to try new things. These seemingly modest resources became the lever that set the entire project in motion.

II. The Core Insight: Creating a Multi-Sided Platform Where Every Party Benefits

The key to overcoming resource scarcity lay in reframing a "one-sided transaction" as a "multi-sided platform." The traditional model works like this: I pay, you speak—a zero-sum bilateral exchange. But what if we could create a platform where multiple parties benefit simultaneously?

The core concept in platform economics is the "multi-sided market." In their seminal paper, Rochet and Tirole showed that a platform's value derives from its ability to reduce transaction costs between different groups and generate positive network effects.[3] Parker, Van Alstyne, and Choudary further argued that successful platforms do not "own" resources but rather "facilitate" their exchange.[4]

I began to ask: Who are the potential participants in this platform? What does each party need?

  • Nobel laureates and academic speakers: They do not lack money (most top scholars donate their speaking fees to universities or charities). What they lack is "amplified influence"—how to make their research understood by a broader audience.
  • Global business leaders: They need a "knowledge dissemination platform"—opportunities to engage with academia, build personal brands, and influence policymakers.
  • Media platforms: They need "high-quality content"—material that drives traffic and builds authority.
  • Professional hosts: They need a "sense of purpose"—participation in meaningful knowledge dissemination rather than purely commercial events.
  • Students and audience members: They need "access to world-class minds"—a luxury typically reserved for paying attendees under conventional models.

If I could design a mechanism that satisfies all parties simultaneously, the platform would become self-sustaining.

III. The Critical Partnership: TMTPost and the Formation of a Multi-Party Alliance

The first key partner for the platform was TMTPost, a prominent Chinese technology and business media outlet founded by veteran journalist Zhao Hejuan, with a large readership in technology, finance, and innovation. I approached TMTPost's founder with a proposal: if we could attract top-tier speakers, would TMTPost be willing to provide media coverage and distribution?

The proposition was virtually risk-free for TMTPost—they would not need to pay anything yet would gain access to exclusive, high-quality content. For speakers, it meant their talks would be broadcast to tens of thousands of Asian viewers via online platforms, dramatically expanding their academic influence. This is precisely the "value net" described by Brandenburger and Nalebuff: create value through cooperation, then allocate it.[5]

The second key partner was a close friend who is a veteran television host. She is a seasoned broadcast professional with extensive interviewing experience. When I invited her to host the series, her response surprised me: "This is meaningful work—I'm happy to contribute pro bono."

Her decision exemplifies the logic of the "gift economy" analyzed by Marcel Mauss.[6] Beyond market economics, human societies have always maintained an alternative form of exchange: gifts are given not for equivalent return but to build social bonds, express identity, and achieve self-actualization. Akerlof and Kranton's identity economics further demonstrates that people's behavior is driven not only by economic incentives but also by "identity" and "meaning."[7] For her, participating in this series fulfilled her identity as a "knowledge communicator"—something more valuable than any fee.

The formation of these partnerships illustrates what Coleman describes as "social capital" being converted into tangible resources.[8] We lacked financial capital, but we had trust, relationships, and a shared vision—social capital capable of mobilizing cooperation that monetary resources alone could not achieve.

IV. The Coordination Game: How to Get Multiple Parties to "Jump" to a New Equilibrium Simultaneously

The core challenge of a multi-sided platform is the chicken-and-egg problem: speakers are willing to come because there is an audience, but the audience shows up because there are speakers.[9] This is a classic coordination game structure.

The hallmark of a coordination game is the existence of multiple equilibria. Suppose there are N potential participants, each of whose payoff depends on how many others participate. Formally:

Let participant i's payoff function be Ui(ai, n), where ai ∈ {Participate, Not Participate}, and n is the number of other participants.

If Ui(Participate, n) > Ui(Not Participate, n) if and only if n > n* (critical mass),

then two pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist:
(1) Everyone participates (high-level equilibrium)
(2) No one participates (low-level equilibrium)

The question is: how do you get everyone to "jump" to the high-level equilibrium simultaneously? Schelling's "focal point" theory provides insight: in coordination games, certain options become natural coordination points because of their "salience."[10]

My strategy was to create a "focal event"—first secure the commitment of a Nobel laureate, then use that as leverage to attract other participants. Professor Robert Aumann became that focal point. When we announced that Professor Aumann would participate, other speakers' willingness to join surged ("If even a Nobel laureate is coming, this must be an important event"), media interest increased accordingly, and audience registrations were quickly oversubscribed.

This "cascade effect" is precisely the informational cascade mechanism analyzed by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch.[11] When early participants (such as Aumann) make their choice, they transmit a positive signal about the event's quality, prompting subsequent participants to update their beliefs and creating a self-reinforcing cycle.

V. Network Effects: A Mathematical Model of Cross-Side Network Externalities

The economic foundation of multi-sided platforms is "cross-side network effects."[12] Unlike traditional single-sided network effects (such as a telephone network, where more users make the network more valuable for each user), the value of multi-sided platforms arises from interactions between different groups.

Let us construct a simplified mathematical model. Assume the platform has three sides: Speakers (S), Media (M), and Audience (A).

Let nS, nM, nA denote the number of participants on each side.

Speaker utility: US = αSM · nM + αSA · nA - CS
(Speaker value derives from media exposure and audience size, minus participation cost)

Media utility: UM = αMS · nS + αMA · nA - CM
(Media value derives from speaker quality and audience traffic, minus coverage cost)

Audience utility: UA = αAS · nS + αAM · nM - CA
(Audience value derives from the speaker lineup and media coverage, minus participation cost such as time)

In this model, α represents the strength of cross-side network effects and C represents participation cost. The platform designer's objective is to lower C (for example, by making participation free for speakers and providing ready-made content for media) while raising α (for example, by ensuring speaker quality to enhance audience value).

Armstrong's research shows that in multi-sided markets, platforms often "subsidize" one side (sometimes even making it free) to attract paying participants on the other side.[13] In our case, we made participation free for all sides—and this was possible because we generated sufficiently large α (value) to make C (cost) relatively insignificant.

VI. Value Creation vs. Value Appropriation: The Co-opetition Framework

Brandenburger and Nalebuff's "co-opetition" theory provides another analytical framework.[14] They distinguish between "value creation" and "value appropriation": in negotiations or competitive settings, the first priority should be to enlarge the pie (create value), and only then to discuss how to divide it (appropriate value).

The traditional "purchase a speaking engagement" model is a value-appropriation game: the speaker demands a high fee, the organizer tries to negotiate it down, and both haggle over a fixed pie. Our platform model, by contrast, first creates new value:

  • For speakers: Transform a lecture from a "one-time event" into a "lasting content asset," amplifying influence through media distribution.
  • For media: Gain exclusive high-quality content without bearing production costs.
  • For the audience: Access knowledge events for free that previously required expensive tickets.
  • For the host: Realize the public-interest value of professional skills and build a new sense of identity.
  • For the school: Build international reputation and attract outstanding students and faculty.

When total value increases, every party can receive more than they would through bilateral transactions alone—this is the essence of a "positive-sum game."[15]

VII. Reputation as Collateral: Trust Mechanisms Under Incomplete Contracts

A critical question is: why were speakers willing to trust us? After all, we were a newly established school with no track record to speak of.

The answer lies in the mechanism of "reputation as collateral."[16] Under incomplete contracts—where legal enforcement cannot fully govern behavior—reputation becomes the key to sustaining cooperation. My prior research experience at Cambridge, published academic works, and existing relationships with international scholars constituted a form of "reputational capital" that lowered partners' perceived risk.

Williamson's transaction cost economics observes that asset specificity creates "hold-up" risk.[17] Yet when both parties invest their reputations, the specificity of reputation actually serves as a safeguard for cooperation—because either party's breach would damage their own reputational capital. My willingness to invest substantial time and effort in organizing this series was itself a "costly signal," conveying my commitment to the project.[18]

VIII. Entrepreneurial Bricolage: Innovation Under Resource Constraints

The concept of "bricolage" proposed by Baker and Nelson precisely describes our resource mobilization process.[19] Originating from French, bricolage originally referred to making do with whatever materials are at hand to repair or create. In entrepreneurship research, it denotes the ability to "create new value from readily available resources."

Baker and Nelson identified three key characteristics of bricolage:

  1. Making do: Accepting resource constraints rather than waiting for "perfect" conditions.
  2. Combination of resources at hand: Recombining seemingly unrelated resources in novel ways.
  3. Refusal to enact limitations: Refusing to accept the conventional definition of "insufficient resources" as an insurmountable barrier.

In our case: we had no budget, so we redefined "payment"—substituting influence, a sense of purpose, and social capital for money; we had no connections, so we started from existing relationships and built new links step by step; we lacked institutional reputation, so we leveraged partners' reputations as endorsements.

This "bootstrapping" approach to entrepreneurship has been analyzed in detail by Bhide and by Winborg and Landstrom.[20][21] The key is not possessing resources but being able to "mobilize" them.

IX. Public Goods and Club Goods: The Economics of Knowledge Dissemination

Traditional academic lectures are a form of "club goods"—they are excludable (only paying or invited attendees can participate) but non-rivalrous (one person's attendance does not diminish another's opportunity to listen).[22]

Our innovation was to transform knowledge from a "club good" into a "public good." Through live streaming and media distribution, lecture content became both non-excludable and non-rivalrous—anyone could watch for free, and an increase in viewers did not diminish the benefit to any individual viewer.[23]

This transformation was possible because we found alternative "revenue models." For speakers, the influence and reputation generated by public dissemination replaced the value of speaking fees; for media, traffic and brand value replaced the cost considerations of content production. Ostrom's research on common-pool resources demonstrates that, with properly designed governance mechanisms, public goods can indeed be effectively provided.[24]

X. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Coalition Formation

The formation of multi-party cooperation can be analyzed using "coalition games."[25] In a coalition game, different participants can form various coalitions, and the value each coalition creates depends on its membership composition.

The Shapley value provides a fair scheme for distributing coalition payoffs: each participant should receive an amount equal to the weighted average of their "marginal contribution" across all possible coalitions.[26]

The Shapley value formula is:

φi(v) = ΣS⊆N\{i} [|S|!(|N|-|S|-1)!/|N|!] · [v(S∪{i}) - v(S)]

where v(S) is the value created by coalition S, and v(S∪{i}) - v(S) is participant i's marginal contribution to coalition S.

In our case, the Nobel laureates' marginal contribution was extremely high (their participation dramatically elevated the overall event's value), yet they did not receive a corresponding monetary return—because they received a different form of "value": influence, a sense of purpose, and the satisfaction of contributing to society. This non-monetary "payment" mechanism is the key to the platform's viability.

XI. The Gift Economy and the Spirit of Volunteerism

The pro bono participation of the veteran television host embodies an exchange mechanism that transcends market logic. In his classic work The Gift, Mauss argued that gift exchange is not an economic "transaction" but a social "obligation"—the recipient of a gift is obligated to reciprocate, though such reciprocation is often deferred, asymmetrical, or even non-material.[27]

Her "gift" was her professional skill and time. As a veteran host, her market value was considerable, yet she chose to invest these resources freely in the public mission of knowledge dissemination. This choice can be understood through several theoretical frameworks:

First, from the perspective of identity economics,[28] her choice reinforced her identity as a "knowledge communicator" rather than merely a "commercial host." The "utility" derived from this identity may well exceed monetary compensation.

Second, from the perspective of social capital,[29] her pro bono involvement created new connections with academia and media—social capital that may yield unforeseen opportunities in the future.

Third, from the perspective of "warm glow" theory,[30] people derive satisfaction from the act of giving itself—Andreoni's research shows that this intrinsic motivation accounts for a large share of altruistic behavior.

The voluntary contributions of such professionals were a critical pillar of the entire ecosystem's success. If every link in the chain had demanded market-rate compensation, this platform could never have launched. It was precisely these "gifts"—of time, skill, and relationships—that bridged the gap left by the absence of financial resources.

XII. Practical Implications: Six Actionable Principles

From this exercise in creating something from nothing, I have distilled six actionable principles:

  1. Redefine "resources": Resources are not limited to money. Social capital, reputation, relationships, skills, and time can all be mobilized, exchanged, and used to create value.
  2. Identify each party's "true needs": Nobel laureates seek influence, media seek content, hosts seek purpose, and audiences seek knowledge. Uncovering these needs reveals the basis for cooperation.
  3. Create value first, then negotiate distribution: Do not begin by asking "How much do you want?" Instead, first design a mechanism that benefits everyone. When the pie is large enough, the question of distribution resolves itself.
  4. Establish a "focal point" to solve the coordination problem: In multi-party coordination, a salient starting point is needed. Secure the first key participant (such as a Nobel laureate) and use that as leverage to attract others.
  5. Invest in reputation: When resources are scarce, reputation is the best collateral. Past achievements, established relationships, and demonstrated commitment all reduce partners' perceived risk.
  6. Value pro bono contributors: Every person willing to give freely is a critical pillar of the ecosystem. The "gifts" they provide cannot be bought with money.

XIII. Conclusion: Perhaps Having No Resources Is the Best Starting Point

Looking back on this journey, I have come to a profound realization: a lack of resources is not an obstacle but a springboard for creativity. It was precisely because we had no budget that we were compelled to rethink the true nature of "value"; precisely because we had no connections that we strove to create a mechanism benefiting all parties; and precisely because we had no reputation that we treasured every opportunity to collaborate.

Nobel laureate Professor Robert Aumann once said in our conversation: "The core of economics is incentives."[31] That remark still echoes in my mind. Our success did not come from persuading anyone to "sacrifice"—it came from discovering an incentive structure that allowed every party to "benefit."

This is the magic of a multi-sided platform: when designed properly, it is not a zero-sum game but a positive-sum ecosystem that makes every participant better off. Whether in academic research, business entrepreneurship, or public policy, this insight carries far-reaching implications.

Finally, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to all the collaborators who made this possible: the TMTPost team for their media support, the professional host for her wholehearted contribution, the two Nobel laureates for sharing their knowledge, dozens of business leaders for their enthusiastic participation, and the hundreds of thousands of audience members for their passionate engagement. This was not one person's achievement but a marvel co-created by an entire ecosystem.

Hung-Yi Chen is a global governance and business strategy scholar. He holds a Doctor of Laws from Nagoya University, Japan, and served as Research Director at Cambridge University's Centre for Alternative Finance, directing research for the World Bank, United Nations, and UK Foreign Office. He has been MBA Director and Executive Education Director at Zhejiang University, and currently leads Meta Intelligence, specializing in AI and quantum computing software development. He organized the Global Thought Leaders Forum, bringing together over 50 international leaders and reaching a cumulative audience of more than 300,000.

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