In 2019, while serving as MBA Director and Master of Finance Director at Zhejiang University International Business School, I set myself a challenge: to establish a partnership with the Australian National University (ANU) College of Business. The problem was that ANU already had a long-standing collaboration with Tsinghua University. Why would they need Zhejiang University? This was not simply a resource competition issue but a question of strategic positioning—the answer lay not in "we are stronger than Tsinghua" but in "we are different from Tsinghua." This experience gave me a profound understanding: in competitive environments, differentiation is often more effective than head-on competition.
1. The Challenge: When Competitors Already Occupy the High Ground
The Australian National University is the highest-ranked university in Australia, ranked 34th globally in the 2024 QS World University Rankings, and its Crawford School of Public Policy is a leading hub for public policy research in the Asia-Pacific region.[1] For any Australian university seeking to expand its Asia-Pacific influence, the Chinese market is a strategically vital territory—China is not only the world's second-largest economy but also Australia's largest source of international students.[2]
Tsinghua University, as one of China's top universities, was naturally ANU's first-choice partner. Tsinghua's advantages are obvious: a global top-20 ranking, an alumni network spanning China's political and business circles, a location in Beijing's political core, and close ties with major international organizations.[3] More importantly, Tsinghua and ANU had already established years of collaboration, including dual-degree programs and joint research centers as institutionalized arrangements.
Facing this competitive landscape, Zhejiang University's conventional approach might have been to emphasize its own academic prestige—"Zhejiang University is also a C9 League member" or "Zhejiang University is also a global top-100 university." But this path was destined to fail. On the dimension of academic prestige, Tsinghua already occupied the commanding heights; head-on competition would only relegate Zhejiang University to the status of "second-best option."
This is precisely what Michael Porter called "the essence of competitive strategy": if you compete on the same dimension, the result is not differentiation but an arms race of "doing it better"—which typically means margin compression and resource attrition.[4]
2. Theoretical Framework: From Head-On Competition to Differentiated Positioning
2.1 Porter's Competitive Strategy: Three Generic Strategies
In his 1980 classic Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter proposed three generic strategies: Cost Leadership, Differentiation, and Focus.[5] Cost Leadership is suited for large-scale competition with standardized products, while Differentiation emphasizes a unique value proposition that makes customers willing to pay a premium.
In the field of higher education, "Cost Leadership" is virtually not an option—top universities do not use "cheaper tuition" as a selling point. Therefore, the only viable strategy is Differentiation: finding unique value that Tsinghua cannot provide or does not emphasize.
2.2 Blue Ocean Strategy: Value Innovation Rather Than Competition
Kim and Mauborgne's Blue Ocean Strategy further developed the differentiation mindset.[6] They argued that firms should not fight over existing markets in the "red ocean" but should create "blue oceans"—opening up new demand spaces through Value Innovation.
The core tools of Blue Ocean Strategy are the Strategy Canvas and the Four Actions Framework: which factors can be "eliminated," "reduced," "raised," or "created"? By redefining the value curve, firms can escape head-on confrontation with competitors.
Applied to Zhejiang University's situation: Tsinghua's value curve was "academic prestige + political capital + alumni network." Zhejiang University should not chase Tsinghua on these three dimensions but should create a new value dimension—and that dimension was the "digital economy ecosystem."
2.3 The Hotelling Model: The Mathematical Logic of Differentiation
Harold Hotelling's 1929 location competition model (the Hotelling Model) provided a mathematical foundation for differentiation strategy.[7] The original model describes two ice cream vendors choosing their positions on a beach: if customers are uniformly distributed along a [0,1] line segment, the two vendors tend to cluster at the midpoint (the principle of minimum differentiation).
However, when we introduce price competition, the conclusion changes completely. D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse proved in their 1979 revised model that when prices are variable, Maximum Differentiation is the equilibrium outcome.[8]
Differentiation Equilibrium in the Hotelling Model
Assume two firms are located at x₁ and x₂ (where x₁ < x₂), customers are at x ∈ [0,1], and transportation cost is a quadratic function t(x - xᵢ)².
The demand function for Firm 1 is:
D₁(p₁, p₂) = (x₁ + x₂)/2 + (p₂ - p₁)/(2t(x₂ - x₁))
The equilibrium prices are:
p₁* = c + t(x₂ - x₁)(2 + x₁ + x₂)/3
p₂* = c + t(x₂ - x₁)(4 - x₁ - x₂)/3
where c is the marginal cost. Key insight: as (x₂ - x₁) increases, equilibrium prices rise, and both firms' profits increase.
Conclusion: The greater the degree of differentiation, the larger the market space and the higher the profits for both parties.
This mathematical result has profound strategic implications: the more "different" Zhejiang University and Tsinghua are, the larger the cooperative space both have with ANU, transforming the situation from a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game.
3. Game Theory Analysis: Why Is Differentiation Superior to Head-On Competition?
3.1 The Destructive Equilibrium of Bertrand Competition
What would happen if Zhejiang University chose to compete with Tsinghua on the "academic prestige" dimension? The Bertrand competition model in game theory provides the answer.[9]
In the Bertrand model, two firms sell homogeneous products and compete on price. The Nash equilibrium is: both parties' prices drop to marginal cost, and profits fall to zero. This is the famous "Bertrand Paradox"—even with only two firms, the outcome of perfect competition emerges.[10]
Applied to higher education: if both Zhejiang University and Tsinghua emphasize "we are China's best university," ANU's optimal strategy is to sit back and wait for the two to bid against each other—who is willing to offer more resources, lower thresholds, or greater concessions? The result is that both are forced to "cut prices" (investing more resources for less return), while ANU reaps the benefits.
3.2 Pareto Improvement Through Differentiated Product Competition
Conversely, when Zhejiang University emphasizes its "digital economy ecosystem"—a dimension that Tsinghua does not possess (or does not emphasize)—the game structure fundamentally changes. This is no longer Bertrand competition but Cournot competition with differentiated products.[11]
In the differentiated Cournot model, the greater the degree of product differentiation, the stronger each firm's market power and the higher the equilibrium profits. More importantly, differentiation creates a "Pareto Improvement"—Zhejiang University gains a partnership opportunity with ANU while Tsinghua's existing collaboration remains unthreatened, because both serve different student needs.
3.3 Multi-Market Contact Theory: Partners Are Not Necessarily Competitors
Edwards' (1955) "Multi-market Contact" theory further explains this phenomenon.[12] When two firms meet across multiple markets, they have stronger incentives to avoid fierce competition, because an attack in any one market could trigger retaliation across all markets.
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) formalized this intuition using game theory: multi-market contact increases the sustainability of "cooperative equilibrium" because deviations can be punished across markets.[13]
The implication of this theory for university cooperation is: Tsinghua and Zhejiang University have overlapping interests across multiple domains (such as the C9 League, Yangtze River Delta cooperation, and international ranking competition). If Zhejiang University's ANU partnership were positioned as "competing with Tsinghua," it might provoke Tsinghua's retaliation in other areas; but if positioned as "complementary," it could earn Tsinghua's tacit approval or even support.
4. The Hangzhou Digital Economy Ecosystem: Zhejiang University's Unique Value Proposition
4.1 Hangzhou: The Heart of China's Digital Economy
What was Zhejiang University's differentiating selling point? The answer lay within three kilometers of the campus: Alibaba Group headquarters.
Hangzhou is not just home to Alibaba—it is the "Silicon Valley" of China's digital economy. According to data from the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, the added value of Hangzhou's core digital economy industries accounts for over 26% of its GDP, ranking first nationwide.[14] Since 2018, Hangzhou has been positioned as "China's No. 1 City for the Digital Economy," and this is not merely a policy slogan but is reflected in the actual scale of its industrial clusters.[15]
Beyond Alibaba, Hangzhou is also home to:
- Ant Group: One of the world's largest fintech companies, with Alipay boasting over 1 billion monthly active users and a valuation that once reached $280 billion.[16]
- NetEase: China's second-largest gaming company, with a market capitalization exceeding $60 billion and diversified businesses including Yanxuan and Cloud Music.[17]
- Hikvision: The world's largest manufacturer of security surveillance equipment, a leader in artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things.[18]
- Dahua Technology, Geely Automobile, Uniview Technologies, and others: forming a complete smart manufacturing and digital services ecosystem.
4.2 A Living Laboratory for Platform Economics
Hangzhou's uniqueness lies not only in the sheer number of companies but in its role as a real-world laboratory for Platform Economics. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2003) defined the core characteristics of Two-sided Markets in their classic paper: platforms connect two (or more) user groups, and each group's value from the platform depends on the participation level of the other group.[19]
The Alibaba ecosystem perfectly embodies this theory: Taobao connects buyers and sellers, Alipay connects consumers and merchants, and Alibaba Cloud connects developers and enterprise clients. More importantly, these platforms form an "ecosystem"—data interoperability and user sharing among platforms create powerful Network Effects.[20]
4.3 The Mathematical Structure of Network Effects
Network effects are a core feature of the digital economy. Katz and Shapiro (1985) proposed the classic model of network effects.[21]
Network Effects Model
Assume that user i derives utility from joining the network as follows:
Ui = v(n) - p
where v(n) is the network value function, n is the number of network users, and p is the price.
If v(n) = αn (linear network effect), then:
Ui = αn - p
The total value of the network is:
V = n × v(n) = αn²
This is the famous "Metcalfe's Law": the value of a network is proportional to the square of its number of users.[22]
Implication: China has the world's largest network user base, making it the best laboratory for studying network effects.
4.4 Cluster Theory: Why Location Matters
Michael Porter's Cluster Theory explains why Hangzhou's digital economy ecosystem is so unique.[23] An industrial cluster refers to the geographic concentration of related companies, suppliers, service providers, and research institutions within a specific area.
Clusters create three types of competitive advantage:
- Productivity gains: specialized suppliers, talent pools, and knowledge spillover effects
- Innovation acceleration: inter-firm competition and cooperation, shared R&D resources
- New business formation: lower barriers to entrepreneurship, concentration of venture capital
Alfred Marshall (1890) observed the phenomenon of "Agglomeration Economics" over 130 years ago, describing how in industrial clusters, "the mysteries of the trade ... are in the air."[24] This is a perfect description of the Hangzhou digital economy ecosystem—walking through the Xixi Park or the Binjiang High-Tech Zone, you can "breathe in" the innovative atmosphere of the digital economy.
5. Value Proposition: Why ANU Needs Zhejiang University
5.1 Portfolio Strategy: From "Substitute" to "Complement"
From ANU's perspective, partnering with Zhejiang University was not "a substitute for Tsinghua" but "a complement in a portfolio strategy." This is standard practice in higher education internationalization—top universities do not rely on a single Chinese partner but construct a diversified cooperation portfolio.[25]
Top business schools such as Harvard Business School, MIT Sloan, and INSEAD all employ similar strategies: collaborating simultaneously with multiple Chinese universities, each positioned around a different region or theme. For example:
- Harvard Business School has partnerships with Tsinghua, CEIBS, and the University of Hong Kong, each with different focal areas
- MIT has cooperative programs or research centers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen
- INSEAD's Asian campus is in Singapore, but it has course collaborations with multiple Chinese universities
5.2 Tsinghua vs. Zhejiang University: Divergent Value Curves
Analyzing through the Blue Ocean Strategy "value curve," the differentiated positioning of Tsinghua and Zhejiang University looks as follows:
| Dimension | Tsinghua University | Zhejiang University |
|---|---|---|
| Academic Prestige | ★★★★★ | ★★★★☆ |
| Political Capital | ★★★★★ (Beijing core) | ★★★☆☆ (Regional hub) |
| Digital Economy Ecosystem | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★★★ (Alibaba ecosystem) |
| Entrepreneurial Atmosphere | ★★★★☆ | ★★★★★ (Hangzhou ecosystem) |
| New Business Resources | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★★★ (Platform economy) |
| Fintech | ★★★☆☆ | ★★★★★ (Ant Group) |
This table clearly shows: on traditional dimensions (academic prestige, political capital), Tsinghua leads; but on emerging dimensions (digital economy, entrepreneurial atmosphere, new business, fintech), Zhejiang University has unique advantages.
5.3 The Value Proposition for ANU
Based on the above analysis, Zhejiang University's value proposition to ANU can be articulated as follows:
"By partnering with Zhejiang University, ANU can:
1. Attract outstanding students interested in the digital economy—a group distinct from the traditional elites drawn to Tsinghua
2. Offer students firsthand immersion in the world's most advanced digital economy ecosystem—not reading case studies, but experiencing it on the ground
3. Gain access to research and internship resources from Alibaba, Ant Group, and other companies
4. Create a 'complementary' rather than 'competitive' relationship with the Tsinghua partnership—two tracks, two types of students, two kinds of value"
6. Brand Association and Partnership Motivation Analysis
6.1 Brand Association Theory
Keller's (1993) Brand Equity Model identifies brand associations as all the memory nodes in a consumer's mind connected to a brand.[26] For universities, brand associations directly influence critical metrics such as student choice, faculty recruitment, and donor willingness.
When ANU partners with Tsinghua, the brand association is "traditional elite, policy influence, global vision"; when ANU partners with Zhejiang University, the brand association is "digital innovation, entrepreneurial spirit, technology frontier." These two associations do not conflict—they enrich ANU's brand portfolio in the Chinese market.
6.2 A Motivational Framework for University Partnerships
Altbach and Knight (2007) analyzed the motivations for university internationalization and categorized them into four types: academic, economic, socio-cultural, and political.[27] Applying this framework to the potential ANU-Zhejiang University partnership:
- Academic motivation: access to cutting-edge research in the digital economy, especially in platform economics and fintech
- Economic motivation: expanding into the southern China market (Yangtze River Delta) and attracting different types of students
- Socio-cultural motivation: enabling Australian students to experience the unique facets of China's digital life
- Political motivation: diversifying Chinese partnerships to reduce dependence on a single relationship
7. Practical Experience: From Persuasion to Implementation
7.1 The Art of Persuasion: The Framing Effect
Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) research on the Framing Effect tells us: the same information, presented in different frames, leads to different decisions.[28]
In communications with ANU, I deliberately avoided defensive frames such as "we are also good" or "we are no worse than Tsinghua," and instead adopted creative frames: "we offer different value" and "this is something Tsinghua cannot give you."
Specific persuasion strategies included:
- Anchoring effect: first introducing Hangzhou as "China's No. 1 Digital Economy City" to establish an initial impression[29]
- Social proof: emphasizing the close relationships between companies like Alibaba and Ant Group and Zhejiang University[30]
- Scarcity: "this is an experience you cannot get in Beijing"—creating a perception of uniqueness[31]
7.2 Partnership Architecture Design
From the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics, international university partnerships involve high levels of Asset Specificity and uncertainty.[32] Williamson's (1985) analytical framework suggests: when transaction costs are high, Hybrid Governance rather than pure market transactions should be adopted.[33]
Therefore, I proposed a partnership architecture based on "progressive institutionalization":
- Phase 1: Faculty exchanges and guest lectures (low commitment, testing the waters)
- Phase 2: Joint research workshops and short courses (medium commitment, building trust)
- Phase 3: Dual-degree programs and joint research centers (high commitment, institutionalization)
8. Universal Takeaways: Six Principles of Differentiated Positioning
From this experience, I distilled six principles of differentiated positioning, applicable to any organization facing strong competition:
- Do not compete on your competitor's strengths—find a unique value dimension your competitor lacks or does not emphasize
- Shift from "who is stronger" to "who is different"—differentiation creates more sustainable advantage than "doing it better"
- Redefine competitors as "complementors"—make your cooperation partner see the value of a "portfolio strategy"
- Leverage the uniqueness of geography or resources—like Hangzhou's digital economy ecosystem, this is something others cannot replicate
- Understand the other party's real needs—ANU did not need "another Tsinghua" but rather "a different choice"
- Use the framing effect to redefine the rules of the game—change the frame of the conversation, and you change the nature of the competition
9. Conclusion: The Blue Ocean Is Not Far Away—It Begins the Moment You Choose to Be Different
Looking back on this experience, the most profound insight is: a blue ocean is not about finding a market with no competitors but about creating a value space that competitors cannot (or will not) enter.
Both Tsinghua and Zhejiang University are among China's top universities, but they need not be rivals. When Zhejiang University chose to emphasize its "digital economy ecosystem" rather than "academic rankings," the game structure shifted from zero-sum to positive-sum—ANU gained an additional partnership option, Zhejiang University achieved a new breakthrough in internationalization, and Tsinghua's existing collaboration was unaffected.
This logic applies to all competitive scenarios: a company facing a market leader, a political candidate challenging a seasoned incumbent, or an entrepreneur competing against resource-rich rivals. Rather than competing head-on, it is better to find differentiated positioning—because the best form of competition is making yourself "a different choice."[34]
The blue ocean is not far away—it begins the moment you decide to be different.[35]
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- Cialdini, R. B. (2006). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: Harper Business. (Revised edition)
- Cialdini, R. B. (2006). The Psychology of Persuasion. Ibid., Chapter 7: Scarcity.
- Williamson, O. E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548-577. doi.org/10.1086/227496
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- Kim, W. C., & Mauborgne, R. (2015). Blue Ocean Strategy, Expanded Edition: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.