While the older generation is still debating "why young people don't buy homes," the younger generation has already lost interest in drinking, buying cars, and dating. Statistics show that global youth alcohol consumption continues to decline: Japan has its "Satori Generation," China has the "lying flat" movement, South Korea has its "N-po Generation," and the West has the "sober curious" movement. These phenomena all point in the same direction: the new generation is redefining what constitutes a "good life," fundamentally challenging traditional consumerism, success narratives, and social norms. Is this youth "passivity" and "decadence," or a rational rethinking of an overconsumption society?
1. The Data Speaks: Young People Really Are "Lowering Their Desires"
The Generational Fault Line in Alcohol Consumption
The trend of young people drinking less is supported by clear data across developed nations worldwide. According to a World Health Organization (WHO) report, alcohol consumption rates among 15- to 19-year-olds in Europe fell by approximately 40% between 2000 and 2019. Data from the UK's Office for National Statistics shows that the proportion of 16- to 24-year-olds who "don't drink at all" rose from 18% to 26% between 2005 and 2021.[1]
The trend in the United States is equally striking. The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future long-term tracking study shows that the drinking rate among American high school students dropped from over 50% in the 1990s to approximately 30% in the 2020s. More notably, young people are not merely "drinking less" — they are "choosing not to drink." Their attitude toward alcohol has shifted from viewing it as a "social necessity" to a "discretionary consumer good."[2]
The situation in Japan is even more pronounced. Data from Japan's National Tax Agency shows that alcohol consumption among the 20-to-29 age group has declined by more than 30% over the past two decades. "Wakamono no sake-banare" (youth distancing from alcohol) has become a common headline in Japanese media. The Japanese government even launched a "sake revival" campaign in 2022, attempting to attract young people back to drinking culture — a policy almost unimaginable in other countries.[3]
Beyond Alcohol: A Comprehensive "Low Desire"
Alcohol consumption is merely the tip of the iceberg. The younger generation exhibits "low desire" characteristics across multiple domains:
- Automobiles: Driver's license ownership rates among young people continue to fall in many countries. In the United States, 46% of 16-year-olds held a driver's license in 1983, but by 2020 only 25% did. The "kuruma-banare" (distancing from cars) phenomenon among Japanese youth is equally significant.[4]
- Luxury Goods: McKinsey surveys indicate that Gen Z shows less interest in traditional luxury brands than Millennials, preferring "experiences" over "possessions."
- Romance and Intimacy: Data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) shows that the rate of sexual activity among high school students dropped from 54% in 1991 to 38% in 2019. Japanese surveys reveal that approximately 40% of single young people have "no interest in romantic relationships."[5]
- Marriage and Childbearing: As noted above, marriage rates and birth rates continue to decline across developed nations worldwide.
These trends point to a common phenomenon: the younger generation is systematically "opting out" of the consumption patterns and life trajectories that the previous generation took for granted.
2. Economic Factors: When Desire Becomes a Luxury
Wage Stagnation and Relative Deprivation
Understanding youth "low desire" requires first examining the economic foundations. In most developed countries, the economic circumstances of the younger generation have deteriorated markedly compared to those of the previous generation. Real wages, adjusted for inflation, have stagnated or declined in many nations; the ratio of housing prices to wages has reached historic highs; the cost of higher education has risen dramatically, leaving many young people burdened with heavy student debt.[6]
Economists describe this phenomenon as "intergenerational inequality." The postwar Baby Boomer generation benefited from rapid economic growth, relatively affordable housing, and stable lifetime employment. Today's young people face sluggish growth, high housing costs, and unstable employment arrangements (the gig economy). When the "normal" life trajectory — graduating, finding employment, marrying, buying a home, having children — becomes increasingly unaffordable, lowering expectations becomes a rational adaptive strategy.[7]
The Opportunity Cost of Consumption
From an economic perspective, every purchase carries an opportunity cost. When "essential" expenditures such as housing, education, and healthcare consume an ever-larger share of income, the space for "non-essential" consumption is naturally compressed. Spending on alcohol, automobiles, luxury goods, and entertainment is cut first when budgets tighten.
Even more subtle is the shift in "mental accounting." When young people realize that even hard work may not enable them to afford a home, they may reassess the meaning of consumption: "Since I can't afford a house anyway, why should I spend money on a car or designer brands for the sake of 'looking successful'?" This psychological shift transforms "low desire" from forced frugality into an active choice.[8]
Lessons from Japan's "Lost Generation"
Japan provides an important precedent. After the bubble economy burst in the 1990s, Japan entered three decades of economic stagnation. The generation that came of age during this period — known as the "Lost Generation" (rosuto jenerēshon) or the "Ice Age Generation" (hyōgaki sedai) — experienced employment difficulties, wage stagnation, and diminished social mobility. They developed a set of "low-cost living" strategies and values that were subsequently inherited and further developed by younger generations.[9]
Japanese economist Kenichi Ohmae systematically described this phenomenon in his 2015 book The Low-Desire Society. He argued that Japanese youth did not "lack desire" but rather "chose not to pursue" in the face of economic reality. This attitude was not merely a personal choice but an adaptive response to the overall socioeconomic structure.[10]
3. Health Consciousness: From Indulgence to Self-Discipline
The "Sober Curious" Movement
Young people's reduced drinking is not driven entirely by economic factors; heightened health consciousness plays an equally important role. The "sober curious" movement has gained momentum among young people in Europe and North America, encouraging individuals to reexamine their relationship with alcohol without committing to complete abstinence. In her 2018 book Sober Curious, Ruby Warrington described this attitude as "questioning the default of drinking" — why must socializing involve alcohol? Why must celebrations involve alcohol? Why must relaxation involve alcohol?[11]
Behind this attitude lies a broader health consciousness revolution. Gen Z grew up in an era of information abundance, with easier access to knowledge about health, nutrition, and fitness than any previous generation. The health risks of alcohol — from liver damage to cancer — are communicated clearly. Meanwhile, fitness, yoga, meditation, and other "healthy lifestyle" practices are extensively promoted on social media, forming a new social norm.[12]
The Mental Health Awakening
The younger generation's emphasis on mental health has also influenced their consumption choices. Research shows that alcohol is a depressant, and long-term or excessive use is associated with depression, anxiety, and other psychological issues. Many young people, having personally experienced or observed these effects among those around them, choose to reduce or avoid alcohol consumption.[13]
At the same time, younger generations are more willing to discuss mental health openly — a topic that was previously taboo. When "taking care of your mental health" becomes a recognized value, forcing oneself to drink in order to "fit in socially" begins to seem unnecessary or even harmful.
An Extension of Bodily Autonomy
From a broader perspective, the shift in young people's attitudes toward alcohol is part of an expanding awareness of "bodily autonomy." This generation emphasizes control over their own bodies — whether regarding dietary choices, sexual behavior, physical appearance, or substance use. "Not drinking" can be viewed as an autonomous choice similar to veganism or the body positivity movement, rather than simple conformity to social norms.[14]
4. Transforming Social Patterns: From Bars to Screens
The Rise of Digital Socializing
Traditionally, alcohol and socializing were inseparable. Bars, nightclubs, and dinner gatherings were the primary venues for young people's social lives, and alcohol served as the "social lubricant" for these occasions. However, digital technology has changed all of this. Social media, online gaming, and streaming services provide social and entertainment options that require no alcohol.[15]
For Gen Z, who grew up with smartphones and social media, "scrolling on a phone at home" may be more appealing than "going out for drinks." This is not necessarily a deterioration of social skills — they are simply socializing on different platforms. Online messaging, video calls, and multiplayer games provide connections that differ from face-to-face interaction but remain meaningful.
Social Anxiety and the "Stay-at-Home" Trend
Of course, there are also more concerning interpretations. Some researchers worry that digital socializing may be exacerbating social anxiety and interpersonal withdrawal among young people. Japan's "hikikomori" phenomenon — long-term seclusion at home and avoidance of social contact — is an extreme case, but it may reflect a broader trend in varying degrees.[16]
In what sociologist Zygmunt Bauman described as "liquid modernity," interpersonal relationships have become more unstable and more "disposable." In this environment, some young people may choose to retreat into the online world, where social interactions are more controllable and less risky. Not drinking may be one facet of this withdrawal — avoiding the pressure to "go out and socialize."
"JOMO" Replacing "FOMO"
Interestingly, a counter-movement to "FOMO" (Fear of Missing Out) has emerged among young people — "JOMO" (Joy of Missing Out). This attitude emphasizes that not attending every party, not following every trend, and not being constantly online is a form of self-care rather than social failure.[17]
This mental shift is closely related to "low desire." When "missing out" is no longer a fear but a choice, the "keeping up with the Joneses" pressure that traditional consumerism relies upon loses its potency. Young people no longer feel that "everyone is drinking so I should too," but rather "I can choose not to drink, and that is my right."
5. A Values Shift: From "Having" to "Being"
Minimalism and Anti-Consumerism
Among the younger generation, minimalism and anti-consumerist thought are on the rise. This movement questions the traditional assumption that "more is better," emphasizing "less is more," "experiences over material goods," and "quality over quantity."[18]
The popularity of books and media such as Marie Kondo's The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying Up and the content of The Minimalists reflects the spread of these values. For these young people, "low desire" is not retreat or failure but a proactive life philosophy — reducing material attachments to focus on what truly matters.
Sustainability and Environmental Awareness
Awareness of climate change and environmental crises has also shaped young people's consumption attitudes. Overconsumption is viewed as one of the root causes of environmental problems; reducing consumption is seen as environmental action at the individual level. Choices such as not buying a car, buying fewer clothes, and opting for local food are both economic considerations and environmental practices.[19]
An extension of this thinking is a questioning of the "growth" narrative. Traditional economics assumes that continuous economic growth is both necessary and desirable; yet an increasing number of young people are asking: Is infinite growth possible on a planet with finite resources? Is it desirable? Within this framework, "low desire" is not a problem but part of the solution.
The "Satori Generation" and the Existential Turn
Japanese media coined the term "Satori Sedai" (the Enlightened Generation) to describe young people born after the mid-1990s. The term implies that they have already "realized" a certain truth about life — that material pursuits do not bring happiness, that the conventional path to success is not worth following, and that peace and contentment can be found in a simple life.[20]
While this label may be overly romanticized, it does capture a genuine values shift: from external achievement to internal fulfillment, from social approval to self-acceptance, from "more" to "enough." This shift echoes aspects of existentialist philosophy — emphasizing individual choice, authenticity, and the autonomous pursuit of life's meaning.
6. Reflections and Future Trends
Reflection 1: Is "Low Desire" Retreat or Evolution?
How one evaluates youth "low desire" depends largely on the observer's value framework. From the perspective of traditional economic growth and consumerism, young people's "non-consumption" is a problem — it slows economic growth, threatens certain industries, and challenges established modes of social reproduction.[21]
But from another angle, "low desire" may represent adaptive evolution. When traditional paths to success become unattainable or undesirable, developing alternative lifestyles is a rational response. When overconsumption threatens environmental sustainability, reducing consumption is a responsible choice. When material pursuit fails to deliver happiness, turning to non-material fulfillment is a wise adjustment.
Perhaps the issue is not that young people's desires are "too low," but that society's "definition of desire is too narrow." If we equate desire solely with material consumption, then non-consumption is indeed "low desire." But if we understand desire as the pursuit of a good life, then young people are simply pursuing a good life in different ways.
Reflection 2: Economic Structures Must Be Reformed
Regardless of how we evaluate young people's value choices, the problems with economic structures are objective realities. When large numbers of young people cannot afford to buy a home, raise children, or even maintain a basic middle-class standard of living, this is not merely a matter of personal choice but a systemic structural failure.[22]
The policy response should not be to "teach young people to have more desires" — this is neither possible nor desirable. Rather, it should be to create conditions that enable those who want a traditional life (marriage, children, homeownership) to achieve it, while also respecting those who choose a different path. This requires affordable housing, stable employment, reasonable social security, and institutional accommodation for diverse lifestyles.
Reflection 3: The End of Consumerism?
Youth "low desire" poses a fundamental challenge to consumerism. Consumerism operates by continuously creating new "needs," new "desires," and new "dissatisfactions." But if an entire generation begins to ask "Do I really need this?" — the engine of consumerism stalls.[23]
Of course, consumerism will not die easily. It will adapt, transform, and find new mechanisms of influence. The "experience economy," "sharing economy," "subscription economy," and other new models are fundamentally still mechanisms for sustaining consumption. But the awakening of young people has at least forced these models to become more "sophisticated" and more subtle, which in itself represents progress.
Reflection 4: New Forms of Social Connection
Traditionally, consumption (including drinking) has served as an important medium for social connection. If young people reduce these activities, how will social bonds be maintained? This is a question that deserves serious consideration.[24]
The optimistic view is that social connection can be achieved through different channels. Shared interests, volunteer work, online communities, and sports groups can all provide meaningful interpersonal connections without requiring alcohol as a lubricant. The pessimistic view is that these alternative forms may not be deep or lasting enough, leading to intensified social atomization.
The truth likely lies somewhere in between. The forms of social connection are indeed changing — some old forms are declining while some new ones are emerging. What matters is not to judge new forms by old standards — the fact that young people socialize differently from the previous generation does not mean they are lonelier or less social.
Outlook: Will "Low Desire" Become the New Normal?
Based on the analysis above, the "low desire" trend is likely to persist and even deepen in the future. Economic factors (high housing prices, employment instability) are unlikely to improve rapidly; health and environmental awareness will continue to rise; digital socializing will further replace traditional socializing; and values shifts tend to be generationally persistent.[25]
For industries dependent on mass consumption — alcohol, automobiles, luxury goods, real estate — this means transformation is imperative. Marketing strategies that simply "create demand" will become increasingly ineffective; they will likely be replaced by more personalized approaches that emphasize alignment with values-driven products and services.
For society as a whole, this means rethinking the definition and goals of "economic growth." If young people no longer pursue traditional consumption-driven growth, can society develop alternative measures of well-being and progress? This is an open question, but also a challenge full of possibility.
Conclusion: The Recalibration of Desire
The "low desire" of today's youth should not be simplistically interpreted as passivity or decadence. It is the result of multiple interwoven factors: economic pressure compelling frugality, health consciousness promoting self-discipline, digital technology reshaping social life, values shifting toward inner fulfillment, and environmental awareness questioning consumerism. Some of these factors are externally imposed constraints; others are internally driven choices. Some are cause for concern; others deserve affirmation.
Perhaps the label "low desire" is itself problematic. Young people do not lack desire — they desire meaningful work, authentic relationships, physical and mental health, inner peace, and environmental responsibility. They have simply stopped translating these desires into the pursuit of material consumption. This is not the disappearance of desire but its recalibration.
For the older generation, understanding rather than judging young people's choices is the starting point for cross-generational communication. For policymakers, creating conditions rather than imposing pressure is the more effective response. For young people themselves, honestly examining their own choices — whether they stem from freedom or helplessness, whether they lead to fulfillment or avoidance — is a mark of mature self-awareness.
Ultimately, a society's health is measured not by how much alcohol or goods its members consume, but by whether its members can live lives they find meaningful. If "low desire" means that young people are exploring sources of meaning beyond consumerism, this may not be a sign of decline but the beginning of new possibilities.[26]
References
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- Miech, R. A., et al. (2023). Monitoring the Future national survey results on drug use, 1975-2022. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. [MTF]
- National Tax Agency of Japan (2022). Sake no Shiori (Handbook on Alcoholic Beverages). Japanese alcohol consumption statistics. [NTA]
- Sivak, M., & Schoettle, B. (2016). Recent decreases in the proportion of persons with a driver's license across all age groups. University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute Report. [DOI]
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020). Youth Risk Behavior Survey Data Summary & Trends Report. See also National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan (2021). National Fertility Survey.
- Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press. Piketty's analysis of wealth inequality.
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- Genda, Y. (2005). A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New Reality Facing Japanese Youth. International House of Japan.
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- Warrington, R. (2018). Sober Curious: The Blissful Sleep, Greater Focus, Limitless Presence, and Deep Connection Awaiting Us All on the Other Side of Alcohol. HarperOne.
- Twenge, J. M. (2017). iGen: Why Today's Super-Connected Kids Are Growing Up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy—and Completely Unprepared for Adulthood. Atria Books.
- Boden, J. M., & Fergusson, D. M. (2011). Alcohol and depression. Addiction, 106(5), 906-914. [DOI]
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- Saito, T. (2013). Hikikomori: Adolescence Without End. University of Minnesota Press. Saito Tamaki's analysis of the hikikomori phenomenon.
- Crook, J. (2018). JOMO is the new FOMO. TechCrunch. See also Dossey, L. (2014). FOMO, digital dementia, and our dangerous experiment. Explore, 10(2), 69-73.
- Millburn, J. F., & Nicodemus, R. (2015). Minimalism: Live a Meaningful Life. Asymmetrical Press.
- Hickel, J. (2020). Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World. Penguin Random House. An advocacy for degrowth.
- Harada, Y. (2013). Satori Sedai (The Satori Generation). Kadokawa Shoten. Origin of the "Satori Generation" concept.
- Gordon, R. J. (2016). The Rise and Fall of American Growth. Princeton University Press. Analysis of decelerating economic growth.
- Standing, G. (2011). The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury Academic.
- Klein, N. (2000). No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies. Picador. An early critique of consumerism.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon & Schuster. A classic analysis of declining social capital.
- Euromonitor International (2023). Global Consumer Trends. Consumer trend forecasts.
- Seligman, M. E. P. (2011). Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-being. Free Press. Positive psychology's redefinition of well-being.