Tech Diplomacy: Taiwan's Role in Global Digital Governance

At this critical juncture when the rules of global digital governance are being written, Taiwan sits atop world-renowned strategic technology assets yet holds virtually no seat at the table of international rule-making. Over the past two decades, I have conducted research and lectured in more than fifteen countries — from Cambridge in the United Kingdom to Hangzhou in China, from Nagoya in Japan to various nations across Southeast Asia — and in every setting, I have observed the same phenomenon: Taiwan's semiconductor prowess is universally recognized and universally needed, yet it is almost never translated into institutional international influence. This article argues that Taiwan needs a "tech diplomacy" strategy that goes beyond "chip diplomacy" — not merely supplying chips, but actively participating in shaping the regulatory framework of the global digital economy. This is not about choosing sides in geopolitics, but a rational strategy of exchanging technological capability for governance discourse power.

I. From Chip Diplomacy to Tech Diplomacy: A Conceptual Upgrade

In recent years, "chip diplomacy" has become a commonly used term to describe Taiwan's international standing. The logic is straightforward: the world's most advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities are concentrated in Taiwan, giving Taiwan irreplaceable strategic value in great-power technology competition — the United States needs Taiwan's chips to drive the AI revolution, Japan needs Taiwan's processes to sustain its automotive and electronics industries, and Europe needs Taiwan's capacity to achieve digital sovereignty. However, I contend that the "chip diplomacy" framework suffers from three fundamental limitations.

The first limitation is "passivity." At its core, chip diplomacy casts Taiwan as a supplier responding to external demand — when the world needs chips, Taiwan's status rises; when technological alternatives emerge or the geopolitical landscape shifts, that status may be destabilized. In discussions with Professor Aumann about game theory, he emphasized a core principle: in repeated-interaction games, participants possessing agenda-setting power hold a fundamental advantage over pure responders. Taiwan's current role in the global technology landscape more closely resembles the latter — an extremely important but inherently passive supply node.^[1]

The second limitation is "singularity." Chip diplomacy ties Taiwan's international value primarily to the single asset of semiconductor manufacturing. This serves as effective leverage in the short term, but from a long-term risk management perspective, over-reliance on a single strategic asset is dangerous. The United States, Japan, and Europe are all actively promoting the localization of semiconductor supply chains — the CHIPS Act, Japan's Rapidus project, and the European Chips Act — and over time, Taiwan's monopoly position in advanced process technology will inevitably be partially diluted.

The third limitation is "insufficient depth." In the value chain of the global digital economy, the influence of rule-making far exceeds that of manufacturing capability. Whoever sets AI safety standards defines the entry barriers for the global AI industry; whoever leads digital trade rules shapes the fundamental framework for cross-border data flows; whoever establishes the baseline for privacy protection commands governance power over the digital economy. Although the European Union does not produce advanced chips, through the GDPR, the AI Act, and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), it wields a disproportionate rule-making influence in global digital governance — this is the so-called "Brussels Effect."^[2]

Therefore, I argue that Taiwan must upgrade from "chip diplomacy" to "tech diplomacy" — a comprehensive international engagement strategy grounded in technological capability, aimed at rule participation, and executed through institutional innovation. This does not mean replacing chip diplomacy, but rather layering soft governance influence atop the foundation of hardware supply.

II. The Rules Competition in Global Digital Governance: Three Battlefields

To understand the opportunity space for Taiwan's tech diplomacy, one must first grasp the three ongoing rules competitions in global digital governance.

The first competition is in the domain of AI governance. From the EU's AI Act to American executive orders, from China's decentralized legislation to the OECD AI Principles, major economies are constructing AI regulatory frameworks along divergent paths. The core of this competition is not merely "how to govern AI," but "whose values will be embedded in global AI rules." From my legal studies background, I see clearly that legal rules are never "neutral" technical documents — they reflect the value priorities, interest structures, and worldviews of their creators. The EU emphasizes fundamental rights protection, the United States prioritizes innovation flexibility, and China focuses on social stability and national security — these different regulatory philosophies will shape the global landscape of future AI development.^[3]

The second competition is in the domain of digital trade rules. Cross-border data flows, digital services taxes, e-commerce regulations, and cross-border supervision of digital currencies — these issues are becoming new focal points of international trade negotiations. The WTO Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce, the DEPA (Digital Economy Partnership Agreement), and the CPTPP's e-commerce chapter are all attempting to establish international frameworks for digital trade rules. However, the fundamental disagreement between countries on data sovereignty versus the free flow of data makes it difficult to reach global digital trade rules. This fragmented regulatory environment presents both a challenge and an opportunity for economies like Taiwan that possess technological capability but limited diplomatic space.

The third competition is in the domain of technical standards. 5G communication standards, AI chip architectures, quantum computing protocols, and IoT security standards — these seemingly purely technical standard-setting processes are in reality far-reaching geopolitical instruments. As Professor Pistor analyzed in our conversation: law is the coding tool of capital, and similarly, technical standards are the coding tools of the digital economy — whoever controls standard-setting controls the structural power of the digital economy. China is actively promoting the internationalization of its technical standards through the "Digital Silk Road" initiative, while the United States counters through technology alliances — as a core node in the global technology supply chain, Taiwan should rightfully command a greater voice in standard-setting.^[4]

III. Taiwan's Unique Advantages and Room for Action

Across these three battlefields, what unique advantages does Taiwan possess that can be converted into tech diplomacy capital?

The first advantage is irreplaceable technological depth. Taiwan is not merely a chip manufacturer but a pioneer of advanced process technology. TSMC's leading position in 3-nanometer and 2-nanometer processes means that the world's most cutting-edge AI hardware is effectively "designed in Taiwan, made in Taiwan." This technological depth qualifies Taiwan to participate in — rather than merely comply with — the international standard-setting for AI hardware. In my work leading Meta Intelligence in AI and quantum computing strategy, I have repeatedly observed a pattern: the most influential technical standards are typically led by participants with the deepest understanding of the technology. Taiwan's engineers do not lack technical comprehension; what they lack are institutional channels for converting that comprehension into international standard-setting discourse power.

The second advantage is the credibility of democratic governance. In the rules competition of global digital governance, "values" are becoming an increasingly important competitive dimension. Democratic nations tend to formulate digital rules that emphasize transparency, accountability, and the protection of civil rights; authoritarian systems tend to prioritize national security, social stability, and centralized data management. As one of the most mature democracies in Asia, Taiwan's digital governance practices — from open government data to civic tech communities, from digital identity authentication to technology-aided pandemic response — have established a high degree of credibility internationally. Professor Gostin specifically mentioned Taiwan's pandemic response in our conversation, calling it a model of public health governance. This practice-based credibility is one of Taiwan's most important soft assets for tech diplomacy.^[5]

The third advantage is cross-cultural connectivity. In my international experience, Taiwanese professionals have a presence in the global technology community that far exceeds the nation's size. From technology companies in Silicon Valley to research institutions in Europe, from industrial alliances in Japan to startup ecosystems in Southeast Asia, Taiwan's technical talent and academic networks form a dense web of international connections. This "human connectivity" is the most fundamental infrastructure of tech diplomacy — when formal diplomatic channels are constrained, "Track Two" exchanges conducted through technology communities, academic collaborations, and industry alliances can often achieve what formal diplomacy cannot.

The fourth advantage is a moderately sized testing ground. Taiwan's population of 23 million makes it large enough to produce meaningful policy experiment results, yet small enough to iterate and adjust quickly — an advantage that large nations find difficult to replicate. Singapore has used similar logic to position itself as a global fintech regulatory sandbox; Israel has leveraged its small-state status to become a global leader in cybersecurity. Taiwan is perfectly positioned to cast itself as a "pioneer testing zone" for global digital governance — implementing, testing, and refining new digital regulations first, then exporting successful experiences as reference templates for international standards.

IV. A Three-Tiered Strategic Framework for Tech Diplomacy

Based on the analysis above, I propose a three-tiered strategic framework for Taiwan's tech diplomacy: the base layer is participation in technical standards, the middle layer is digital rule exportation, and the top layer is the construction of a values-based alliance.

Base layer strategy: Deep participation in technical standard-setting. Taiwan should systematically expand its involvement in international standards organizations such as ISO, IEC, IEEE, and 3GPP. This does not require attendance under the national name — Taiwanese enterprises and research institutions can participate directly in standards proposals as technical contributors. Priority areas include: safety standards for AI chips, interoperability standards for advanced packaging technology, and resilience standards for semiconductor supply chains. Taiwan's approach should not be a political gesture of "fighting for seats," but a professional pathway of "earning discourse power through technical strength." The principle that Professor Wilson emphasized in our discussion of auction mechanism design applies here: well-designed mechanisms allow genuine capability to reveal itself naturally — when Taiwan's technical contributions become indispensable to standard-setting, the political cost of excluding Taiwan will naturally rise.^[6]

Middle layer strategy: Building a "Trusted Digital Governance" brand. Taiwan should deliberately position itself as an international benchmark for "trusted digital governance." Specific measures include: pioneering a transparent and accountable AI regulatory framework and exporting it as a reference template for other democracies; establishing a national-level AI safety testing facility to provide AI compliance verification services for multinational companies in the Asia-Pacific region; and leading the establishment of a digital trust framework for the Asia-Pacific — covering interoperability standards for digital identity mutual recognition, cross-border data flows, and privacy protection. This strategy of "building an international brand through governance capability" is highly consistent with the principle that Professor Nalebuff emphasized in negotiation theory — "creating value before claiming value" — Taiwan is not competing for power but providing governance public goods that other countries also need.^[7]

Top layer strategy: Building a democratic technology alliance. Taiwan should proactively initiate or deeply participate in technology governance cooperation among democratic nations. This does not mean confronting specific countries, but rather working with like-minded nations to jointly develop best practices in digital governance. The U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the EU's "Global Gateway" initiative, and Japan's "Data Free Flow with Trust" (DFFT) framework are all multilateral platforms where Taiwan can gain a foothold. Taiwan does not need to obtain formal membership in every international organization — in the domain of technology governance, "functional participation" (contributing substantive content through technical capability) is often more effective than "formal participation" (obtaining a seat but with limited influence).

V. From Vision to Action: Policy Recommendations and Institutional Design

Translating the strategic vision above into actionable policy requires several key institutional developments.

First, establish a "Special Envoy for Tech Diplomacy" mechanism. It is recommended that a Special Envoy for Tech Diplomacy be established under either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the National Science and Technology Council, tasked with coordinating Taiwan's international participation in global digital governance. Denmark pioneered the appointment of the world's first "Tech Ambassador" in 2017, stationed in Silicon Valley rather than a traditional capital, specifically responsible for digital governance dialogue with tech giants and international organizations. Taiwan should draw from this model but imbue it with a stronger technical expertise profile — the Special Envoy for Tech Diplomacy should not be a traditional diplomat but a cross-disciplinary professional who combines technological understanding with international vision.^[8]

Second, establish a "Digital Governance Export" platform. Taiwan's governance experience in digital identity, e-government, and open data holds direct reference value for many developing countries. The establishment of a "Taiwan Digital Governance Academy" is recommended, providing digital governance training for government officials from allied nations and New Southbound Policy partner countries — from e-government system development to AI regulatory framework design. This is not merely technical assistance but the building of long-term institutional influence through the export of governance capability. During my time at Cambridge University, I witnessed firsthand how the United Kingdom maintains global influence far exceeding its national power through the international export of academic institutions and policy research — Taiwan has every capacity to replicate this model in the domain of digital governance.

Third, promote the internationalization of "Taiwan Digital Governance Standards." Taiwan should take the lead in formulating and implementing high-standard digital governance rules in specific niche areas, establishing them as reference benchmarks for the international community. The most promising areas include: information security standards for the semiconductor supply chain (Taiwan is the only country capable of verification from the manufacturing end), evaluation frameworks for trustworthy AI (combining Taiwan's technological strength with its democratic governance experience), and cross-border governance of digital health data (combining Taiwan's National Health Insurance data with its privacy protection practices). Professor Guillen noted in our conversation that the evolution of global trends is often defined by "first movers" — whoever establishes the rules first holds structural advantage in subsequent international coordination.^[9]

Fourth, strengthen the tech diplomacy function of industry-academia-research collaboration. Taiwan's universities and research institutions should be incorporated as strategic assets for tech diplomacy. The establishment of "Digital Governance Policy Centers" at leading universities is recommended, engaging in cross-national comparative research and cultivating talent with dual competencies in technology and policy. In my successive appointments at Cambridge University and Zhejiang University, I have found that the hub function of universities in international policy networks is often underestimated — academic conferences, joint research projects, and talent exchanges are among the most efficient channels for building long-term international influence.

Fifth, establish a performance evaluation mechanism for tech diplomacy. Tech diplomacy should not remain at the level of slogans but must establish measurable performance indicators: the number of technical proposals submitted by Taiwan to international standards organizations and the rate of their adoption; the number of cases where Taiwan's digital governance models have been referenced or adopted by other countries; the number of digital governance cooperation memoranda of understanding signed by Taiwan with like-minded nations. As Professor Wilson emphasized in our discussion of mechanism design: what is not measured is not managed, and what is not managed does not progress.

Reviewing the argument of this article as a whole, Taiwan's tech diplomacy should not be viewed as an appendage to traditional diplomacy but should be positioned as one of the core strategic axes of national strategy. At this historical window when digital governance rules are being written, Taiwan possesses multiple assets ranging from technological capability to governance experience, from democratic values to international networks. The question is not whether Taiwan can participate in global digital governance, but whether we have sufficient strategic awareness and the courage for institutional innovation to systematically convert these assets into enduring international influence. Chips are Taiwan's past and present; discourse power in technology governance should become Taiwan's future.^[10]